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Abstract
This study extends the literature on portfolio choice under prospect theory
preferences by introducing a two-period life cycle model, where the household
decides on optimal consumption and investment in a portfolio with one risk-free
and one risky asset. The optimal solution depends primarily on the household’s
choice of the present value of the consumption reference levels relative to the
present value of its endowment income. If the present value of the consumption
reference levels is set below the present value of endowment income, then the
household behaves in such a way to avoid relative losses in consumption in any
present or future state of nature (good or bad). As a result the degree of loss
aversion does not directly affect optimal consumption and risk taking activity.
However, it must be sufficiently high in order to rule out outcomes with relative
losses. On the other hand, if the present value of the consumption reference
levels is set exactly equal to the present value of the endowment income, i.e., the
household sets its reference levels such that they are in balance with its income,
then the household’s optimal consumption is the reference consumption in both
periods and the household will not invest in the risky asset. Finally, if the present
value of the household’s consumption reference levels is set above the present value
of its endowment income, then the household cannot avoid experiencing a relative
loss in consumption, either now or in the future. As a result, loss aversion directly
affects consumption and risky investment. Reference levels play a significant role
in consumption and risk taking activity. In most cases the household will “follow
the Joneses” if the reference levels are set equal to the consumption levels of the
Joneses. Independent of how consumption reference levels are set, being more
ambitious, i.e., increasing one’s reference levels, will result in less happiness. The
only case when this is not true is when reference levels increase with growing
income (and the present value of reference levels is set below the present value of
endowment income).
Keywords: prospect theory, loss aversion, consumption-savings decision, portfolio allo-
cation, happiness
JEL classification: G02, G11, E20
1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the factors that influence a household’s consumption and savings
decision, based on behavioral economics preferences. Households make decisions on how much
to consume today and how much to save for the future when, e.g., they retire. Savings are
the means of transferring consumption into the future and of having income for retirement
or the means of transferring future income to the present in order to be able to afford more
consumption today. Moreover, households do not only decide how much to save but also how
to allocate their savings into different types of assets. These decisions are made knowing that
the future is risky and uncertain.
Traditionally, the expected utility (EUT) framework has been used to model such be-
havior.1 This research will deviate from the EUT model and will explore a different type of
preferences. In particular, we will assume prospect theory preferences that were introduced
and developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and
that take into account also psychological aspects of households’ behavior. Prospect theory
can be characterized by the following properties. Decision makers under risk evaluate gains
and losses with respect to some reference level, rather than evaluating absolute values (of
their wealth or consumption). Households exhibit loss aversion, which means that they are
more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude. In addition, households display
risk aversion in the domain of gains but show risk appetite in the domain of losses, which is
described by an S-shaped value function that is concave in the domain of gains and convex
in the domain of losses.2 For a comprehensive overview on prospect theory see, e.g., Barberis
(2013) and DellaVigna (2009).
We address a number of issues on the savings behavior under prospect theory preferences
that have only partially been explored in the literature before. How do households decide
on consumption and portfolio decisions when faced with prospect theory type of preferences?
Do households have to be sufficiently loss averse to yield reasonable optimal solutions for
consumption and investment decisions? Does loss aversion affect consumption and portfolio
decisions? Do reference levels affect the households’ consumption, savings and portfolio choice
to transfer consumption into the future? If yes, how? Do households “follow the Joneses”,
(i.e., compare themselves to and follow neighbors or associates) when making consumption
and savings decisions?
There are many different types of reference points that can be considered in exploring the
savings behavior and portfolio choice. The first reference levels that were used are subsistence
levels of consumption (see, e.g., Stone, 1954 and Geary, 1951). Under such preferences,
households get utility from consumption in excess of a subsistence level. Individuals have to
1For original work in this area see Sandmo (1968, 1969) and Merton (1969, 1971).
2Another property, not included in this study, is that the probabilities assigned to the utility of the outcomes
are not objective but subjective (so-called decision weights), as people seem to underestimate large probabilities
and overestimate small probabilities.
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consume a certain minimal level irrespective of its price or the person’s income. The savings
and portfolio choice with subsistence consumption has recently been explored by Achury et
al. (2012). They use the Stone-Geary expected utility model to explain a number of observed
empirical facts such as why the rich have a higher savings rate, higher holdings of risky assets
relative to personal wealth and a higher consumption volatility than the poor.
Another commonly used reference dependent preference model is habit persistence. The
habit persistence model assumes that households derive utility from consumption relative to
a reference level that depends on past consumption levels. Habit persistence models have
been used in many applications in macroeconomics and finance and can to some extent ex-
plain, for instance, the equity premium puzzle and the behavior of asset returns (Abel, 1990;
Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), excess smoothness in consumption ex-
penditures (Lettau and Uhlig, 2000) and business cycles characteristics (Boldrin et al., 2001;
Christiano et al., 2005).
Reference levels can also be set by comparing one’s consumption levels to others (Falk
and Knell, 2004).3 According to the psychology literature, people can be governed by self-
enhancement and/or self-improvement motives. The former motive occurs when people want
to make themselves feel better by setting their references at low levels, possibly reflecting
the wealth of poorer people. However, people also place importance on the self-improvement
motive. Here people compare themselves with others who are more successful and as a result
set their reference levels high.
Many of the applications of prospect theory in portfolio selection assume that the reference
level is the investor’s return from investing all initial wealth into the risk-free asset (Barberis
and Huang, 2001; Gomes, 2005; Barberis and Xiong, 2009; Bernard and Ghossoub, 2010; He
and Zhou, 2011). Barberis et al. (2001), Berkelaar et al. (2004), Fortin and Hlouskova (2011,
2015) and Gomes (2005) use also a dynamic updating rule for the reference point. Future
utility, in one-period models, is derived from the excess return of the risky asset holdings.
One of the major findings of this literature is that investors may not invest in risky assets
even if its expected return is higher than the risk-free rate.
Some work has been devoted to exploring the consequences of reference dependent pref-
erences for inter-temporal two-period habit-persistence consumption decisions, when future
income is uncertain and when households are loss averse, see, e.g., Bowman et al., 1999. They
find that a household will resist reducing its consumption level when there is bad news about
future income. Furthermore, the resistance to reducing consumption with bad news is greater
than the resistance to increasing consumption in response to good news.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) assume rational expectations in the formation of reference levels.
Assuming agents are more affected by news about current consumption than by news about
future consumption, they find that people would intend to overconsume today relative to
3For a literature review see Clark et al. (2008).
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their optimal plans. They would increase consumption right away when good news regarding
wealth arrives, but would postpone decreasing consumption when receiving bad news. Thus,
higher wealth reduces the painful impact of bad news, and as a result people save more for
precaution.
Van Bilsen et al. (2014) investigate optimal consumption and portfolio choice paths of a
loss averse household but with an endogenous reference level. They find that households strive
to protect themselves against consumption losses in order to avoid bad states of nature. They
attribute this behavior to loss aversion. Due to the dynamic nature of their set-up they can
investigate the effect of financial shocks and find that consumption choices adjust only slowly
to financial shocks and that welfare losses are substantial with suboptimal consumption and
portfolio selections.
Our research complements the work by Van Bilsen et al. (2014) in that it provides
additional insights as discussed below. We provide a closed-form solution to the inter-temporal
consumption and portfolio decision of a prospect theory household in a theoretical two-period
model, where uncertainty arises from the risky asset. We assume that the asset’s return follows
a Bernoulli distribution, i.e., there are two states of nature realizing with certain probabilities,
and that the household’s consumption reference levels are set exogenously. These reference
levels are compared with the household’s consumption levels and the household derives its
utility from the difference between its consumption and the reference level. Consuming above
the reference level means that the household incurs relative gains while consuming below
the reference level means that it incurs relative losses. It turns out that the consumption
reference levels (in both periods) as well as the loss aversion parameter are crucial in the
analysis. The solution depends on the household’s choice of the consumption reference levels,
more precisely, on the present value of the chosen reference levels relative to the present value
of the endowment income. Hence we have three different types of households with reference
levels below, equal to or above the income.
Our main results are the following. If the household sets its references levels such that
the present value is below the present value of its endowment income, then it behaves in such
a way that it avoids relative losses in any present or future state of nature (good or bad). So
optimal consumption is always above the reference level. This implies that the degree of loss
aversion does not directly affect optimal consumption and risk taking activity. However, loss
aversion must be sufficiently high in order to prevent relative losses. Further, the household
always invests in the risky asset. If, on the other hand, the household sets its references levels
such that the present value is equal to the present value of its endowment income, i.e., the
household completely balances reference levels and income, then the optimal consumption is
equal to the reference consumption in both periods. Also the household does not invest in the
risky asset in this case. Finally, if the household sets its reference levels such that the present
value is above the present value of its endowment income, then it cannot avoid relative losses
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at all times. Either in the first or in the second period (good or bad state of nature) the
household has to accept consuming below the reference level. This implies that loss aversion
directly affects consumption and investment in the risky asset. Investment in the risky asset
is again positive in this case. We look at various examples of how consumption reference
levels are set, including the case when households set their reference levels according to the
consumption of the “Joneses” (neighbors or associates) and examine what happens to the
implied optimal consumption. Mostly prospect theory households “follow the Joneses” in the
sense that their optimal consumption follows the Joneses’ consumption. Another interesting
result of the sensitivity analysis is that increasing one’s reference level, i.e., increasing one’s
targets and thus being more ambitious leads to less happiness.4 This is true for all three
types of households, i.e., independent of whether households set their consumption reference
levels below, equal to, or above the income.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the set-up of the model. In
section 3 we investigate the case where the households sets its reference levels such that the
present value is below the present value of its endowment income (low aspirations). Section 4
explores the case where the present value of consumption reference levels is exactly equal to
the present value of the household’s endowment income. Section 5 examines the case where
the household sets its reference levels such that the present value is above the present value of
its endowment income (high aspirations). Finally, we summarize and offer some concluding
remarks and future extensions.
2 Problem set-up
We consider a household that lives for two periods. In the first period it receives a non-
stochastic exogenous income (labor income, endowment income), Y1 > 0, which it can allocate
to current consumption, C1, risk-free investment, m, and risky investment, α, where the sum
of the risky and risk-free investment are savings S. Thus, in the first period
Y1 = C1 +m+ α = C1 + S (1)
We consider two assets, a risk-free asset with a net of the dollar return rf > 0 and a risky
asset with stochastic net of the dollar return r that yields rg in the good state of nature, which
occurs with probability p, and rb in the bad state of nature, which occurs with probability
1− p. We assume that −1 < rb < rf < rg, 0 < p < 1, and E(r) = p rg +(1− p)rb > rf . Thus,
in the second period the household consumes
C2i = Y2 + (1 + rf )m+ (1 + ri)α
4The term “happiness” is used to denote the indirect (optimal) utility.
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where Y2 ≥ 0 is the non-stochastic income of the household in the second period, which
can also be thought of as an exogenous government pension income. There are no liquidity
constraints that prevent the household from consuming any exogenous future income in the
first period, but consumption is not allowed to be negative in either period, so that it can
only partially borrow against uncertain future income. This means that risk-free savings, m,
can be negative to a certain extent. The value (1 + rf )m + (1 + ri)α represents the wealth
acquired from capital investment, i ∈ {b, g}. So, in the second period the household consumes
C2b in the bad state of nature and C2g in the good state of nature. Based on this and (1) the
consumption in the second period is
C2i = Y2 + (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (ri − rf )α (2)
The household’s preferences are described by the following reference based utility function
U(C1, α) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ V (C2 − C¯2) (3)
where C¯1 and C¯2 are exogenous consumption reference or comparison levels, such that 0 ≤
C¯1 < Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
and 0 ≤ C¯2 < (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2, i.e., Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
> max
{
C¯1,
C¯2
1+rf
}
, δ is the
discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, and V (·) is a prospect theory (S-shaped) value function defined as
V (Ci − C¯i) =


(Ci−C¯i)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci ≥ C¯i
−λ (C¯i−Ci)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci < C¯i

 (4)
for i = 1, 2. Parameter λ > 1 is the loss aversion parameter and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter
determining the curvature of the utility function. If consumption is above the reference level
we talk about (relative) gains, if it is below the reference level we talk about (relative) losses.
The utility has a kink at the consumption reference level and it is steeper for losses than
for gains, i.e., a decrease in consumption is more severely penalized in the domain of losses
than in the domain of gains. Finally, the utility function is concave above the reference point
and convex below it. The household is thus risk averse in the domain of gains (i.e., above
the consumption reference level) and risk seeking in the domain of losses (i.e., below the
consumption reference level), see Figure 1.
The household maximizes the following expected utility as given by (3) and (4)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ EV (C2 − C¯2)
such that : C1 ≥ 0, C2b ≥ 0, C2g ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0
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(relative) gains(relative) losses
reference point
Figure 1: Loss aversion (S-shaped) utility
Based on this and (2) the household’s maximization problem can be formulated as follows
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ EV
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (ri − rf )α+ Y2 − C¯2
)
such that : 0 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α,
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2
rf−rb
(5)
Note that the upper bound on C1 follows from C2b ≥ 0 and the upper bound on α follows from
the imposition of the upper bound on C1 being non-negative, i.e. Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≥ 0.5
The condition on α means that short sales are not allowed.6
5Imposing positive lower bounds on consumption in both periods (i.e., on C1, C2b and C2g), so that the
household does not “starve”, would not substantially change our results. In occurrences when the optimal
consumption hits zero now, it would hit the lower bound then. Thus, the behavioral implications of our
findings related to the sensitivity analysis and thus comparisons to others would not change.
6Fortin, Hlouskova and Tsigaris (2015) show that the assumption p >max
{
rf−rb
rg−rb
,
(rf−rb)
1−γ
(rf−rb)
1−γ+(rg−rf )
1−γ
}
rules out short-selling if there is no non-negativity restriction on α. Note that E(r) > rf is equivalent to
p >
rf−rb
rg−rb
, so only E(r) > rf is not sufficient to rule out short sales (except in section 3).
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Before proceeding further, we introduce the following notation
Ω = (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − C¯2
= (1 + rf )
[(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
−
(
C¯1 +
C¯2
1 + rf
)]
(6)
Kγ =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
1−γ
p(rg − rf )1−γ
(7)
M =
(
δ(1 + rf ) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
) 1
γ rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
(8)
In addition notice that
K0 =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
p (rg − rf )
= Kγ
(
rf − rb
rg − rf
)γ
< 1
In the following analysis we consider three fundamentally different situations, which give
rise to profoundly different types of optimal consumption behavior. These situations are
characterized by how the household sets its consumption reference levels in relation to its
endowment income. Namely, whether the difference between the present value of total en-
dowment income and the present value of the sum of the consumption reference levels is
positive (Ω > 0), zero (Ω = 0), or negative (Ω < 0).7 The case when Ω is positive is charac-
teristic for households with low aspirations, while the case when Ω is negative is typical for
households with high aspirations. The case when Ω is zero is a special case, where the present
value of the household’s total endowment income is exactly equal to the present value of the
consumption reference levels.
In the formal analysis we split the household’s consumption decision problem (5) into
eight separate problems, (P1)–(P8), which differ in their respective domains, i.e., in their sets
of feasible solutions. These domains are specified by whether first and second period (in the
good and bad state of nature) consumption levels are above or below the respective reference
levels. This yields a total of eight combinations, see Appendix A. Households with a positive
Ω will operate on certain domains which differ from the domains on which households with a
negative Ω operate.
3 Low reference values relative to endowment income (Ω > 0)
We now consider the case when the household sets its consumption reference levels such that
the present value is below the present value of its endowment income, i.e., when Ω > 0. This
7Note that Ω denotes the difference between the present value of total endowment income and the present
value of the sum of the consumption reference levels multiplied by the gross return of a dollar investment in
the risk-free rate, see equation (6). Note, in addition, that future income and consumption reference levels are
discounted at the risk-free rate.
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is done when the household has low aspirations. To proceed with the analysis let us introduce
the following notation
λΩ≥0 =
Ω1−γ
δ(1 − p)(1 + rf )C¯
1−γ
2
[
(1 + rf + k2)
γ
(
1 +
rg − rf
rg − rb
C¯2
Ω
)1−γ
− (1 + rf +M)
γ
]
=
(
1 + rf
k
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)γ (
Ω
C¯2
rg − rb
rg − rf
+ 1
)1−γ
−
(
1 + rf
k
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
+ 1
)γ (
Ω
C¯2
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ
(9)
We can now formulate the main result for the case when Ω > 0.
Proposition 1 Let Ω > 0 and λ > max
{
1
Kγ
, λΩ≥0,
(
M
1+rf
)γ}
. Then problem (5) obtains a
unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗) where
C∗1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf +M
= C¯1 +
1 + rf
1 + rf +M
[(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
−
(
C¯1 +
C¯2
1 + rf
)]
> C¯1 (10)
α∗ =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(C∗1 − C¯1) > 0 (11)
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
When Ω is positive then aspirations are low, which should make it easier for a household
to reach and exceed its consumption comparison levels than when aspirations are high. If, in
addition, the utility is such that consumption below the reference levels is sufficiently penal-
ized, i.e., the loss aversion parameter is large enough, then we expect optimal consumption
to exceed its reference levels. This is indeed what we observe: optimal consumption levels
in both periods are strictly larger than their corresponding reference levels provided that the
household is sufficiently loss averse, i.e., C∗1 > C¯1 and C
∗
2g ≥ C
∗
2b > C¯2, where
C∗2g = C¯2 +
MΩ
(1 + rf +M)
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
) rg − rb
rf − rb
(12)
C∗2b = C¯2 +
MΩ
(1 + rf +M)
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
) rg − rb
rf − rb
K
1
γ
0 (13)
Thus the optimal behavior is characterized by avoiding any relative losses to happen or, in
other words, the household’s aspirations are fully attained. We note further that optimal
investment in the risky asset is strictly positive, i.e., α∗ > 0, which implies that the house-
hold takes on risk in the financial market. Total savings, however, can be either positive or
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negative.8
Although the existence of the solution does depend on the loss aversion parameter λ,
the solution itself, (C∗1 , α
∗), does not directly depend on it. The reason for this is that the
household’s optimal solution is reached in problem (P1), where the solution is found in the
domain given by C1 ≥ C¯1, C2b ≥ C¯2 and C2g ≥ C¯2, i.e., both periods’ consumption levels
are above their consumption reference levels and thus the utility does not depend on the loss
aversion parameter λ (see Appendix A). However, for this to happen the household needs to
be sufficiently loss averse, namely λ > max
{
1
Kγ
, λΩ≥0,
(
M
1+rf
)γ}
. Hence, if the household
is sufficiently loss averse it will make choices that avoid any relative losses from occurring.
As the domains of all remaining problems (P2)–(P8) contain a relative loss, see Appendix
A, a sufficiently loss averse household will never select solutions from these problems. This
behavior is only possible, however, when the household does not set its goals (consumption
reference levels) too high with respect to its income, thus, when Ω is positive.9 Note, finally,
that problem (P1) is known from the studies on habit formation, where the consumption
habits are addictive and never fall below certain consumption targets (see, for example, Yu,
2015).
Table 1 summarizes the sensitivity results related to the solution presented in Proposition
1, so for a sufficiently loss averse household with low aspirations. In particular, we present
the changes of the first and second period optimal consumption, of the optimal investment in
the risky asset, of the first and second period consumption gap, of optimal savings10 and of
happiness (first row) with respect to changes in the loss aversion parameter and the first and
second period consumption reference levels (first column). By “consumption gap” we mean
the distance between the optimal consumption and its reference level, |C∗i − C¯i|, i = 1, 2, and
we use “happiness” to denote the household’s indirect utility (i.e., its value at the optimum).
We also use “relative consumption” to denote the difference between optimal consumption
and the reference level, which is closely related to the previously defined consumption gap.
The gap is always positive while relative consumption can be either positive or negative. Both
definitions coincide if optimal consumption is above the reference level.
Since the solution does not explicitly depend on the loss aversion parameter, as discussed
above, an exogenous increase in the loss aversion parameter, keeping everything else constant,
does not change the solution or the utility at the solution (happiness).
An exogenous increase in the first period consumption reference level, keeping everything
else constant, will increase the first period optimal consumption, decrease risky asset hold-
ings and also decrease savings. As less income is transferred to the second period we would
8The assumption required for S∗ > 0 is M(Y1− C¯1) > (Y2− C¯2). This breaks down to simpler formulations
in special cases.
9When Ω is negative, the household cannot totally avoid relative losses. It will have to face relative losses
in the first or second period, or in the good or bad state of nature.
10The results for optimal savings follow from
dC∗1
dC¯1
and Y1 = C
∗
1 + S
∗.
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dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ d(C∗1 − C¯1) d(C
∗
2g − C¯2) d(C
∗
2b − C¯2) dS
∗ d(E(U(C∗1 , α
∗)))
dλ = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 – – – = 0 = 0
dC¯1 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 – – < 0 < 0
dC¯2 < 0 ≶ 0 > 0 < 0 – < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Table 1: Sensitivity results when aspirations are low (Ω > 0)
expect consumption to decrease in the second period. This is what we indeed observe: the
second period consumption in either state of nature will fall with an increase in the first
period consumption reference level. Even though optimal first period consumption increases
in response to an exogenous increase in the first period consumption reference level, rela-
tive optimal consumption in the first period, i.e., the amount by which the reference level is
exceeded, decreases. This means that the extent of the increase in the first period consump-
tion reference level is not fully matched by the resulting increase in the first period optimal
consumption. In summary, if the household increases the first period consumption reference
level it will reduce the growth rate of consumption. Finally, an increase of the first period
consumption reference level decreases the happiness level.
An increase in the second period consumption reference level, keeping everything else
constant, will decrease the first period optimal consumption and risky asset holdings but
increase both total savings and the risk-free investment. However, the increase of the risk-
free investment is not sufficient to offset the reduction in risky assets in such a way that
second period consumption will increase in both states of nature. Only in the bad state of
nature optimal consumption in the second period will increase. In the good state of nature
the response can be either an increase or a decrease of consumption. Probably the reduced
risky investment – and hence the reduced potential to achieve high returns – is the reason why
this is the case. Relative optimal consumption in the second period decreases if the second
period consumption reference level is increased, which is in analogy to the situation when the
first period consumption level is increased. The happiness level is negatively related to the
second period consumption reference level, as it was to the first period consumption reference
level. So if a household is “more ambitious” (i.e., if it increases its consumption reference
level), in either the first or the second period, its happiness level will decrease.
The fact that consumption reference levels are exogenous gives us the opportunity to
present some interesting examples. Consider, for instance, the case when the first period
reference level is equal to the first period consumption level of other people that the household
is associated with, i.e., the household compares itself to neighbors or peers. Then, if the
first period consumption level of the other people increases, this household will respond by
increasing its first period reference consumption level and because of this it will increase its
first period optimal consumption level, reduce risk taking and reduce its future consumption
in both states of nature. Hence, the household’s behavior is one that “follows the Joneses”
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(i.e., the neighbors or peers the household wants to compare itself to).11 In addition, the gap
between the household’s first period consumption and its consumption reference level narrows
as the consumption level of the others increases. On the other hand, let the household’s second
period reference level be equal to the expected second period consumption level of other
associates. Then, if the household expects the other people to have a higher expected future
consumption, it will increase its second period consumption reference level, which will reduce
its first period consumption, reduce risk taking but increase risk-free investment leading to an
increase in consumption in the second period in the bad state of nature but not necessarily
in the good state of nature. Here it is not clear that the household follows the Joneses in
the second period, even when its first period consumption is reduced to achieve an increase
in future consumption like the household’s associates. However, the consumption gap in the
second period declines in both states of nature when the second period consumption reference
increases, bringing closer to the reference the consumption levels in the second period.
In what follows we will refer to “following the Joneses” in the first period when the
increase (or decrease) of the first period consumption of the Joneses (a reference household)
impacts this household such that its first period consumption will change in the same way
as the one of the Joneses. I.e., it will increase, if the first period consumption of the Joneses
increased and decrease if the first period consumption of the Joneses decreased. In our set-up
this works in the way that the household adjusts its consumption reference level according
to what the Joneses do. So it will increase its first period consumption reference level if the
Joneses increase their first period consumption. In addition, we will refer to the “following
the Joneses” in the second period when the increase (or decrease) of the expected second
period consumption of the Joneses impacts the second period expected consumption (of the
household under considerations) such that it will change in the same way as that of the
Joneses. As before, the household will increase its second period consumption reference level
if the Joneses increase their second period expected consumption. So the idea of “following
the Joneses” is to introduce external preferences into the household’s behavior. Based on this
terminology we can say that a sufficiently loss averse household with low aspirations follows
the Joneses in the first period but not necessarily in the second period.
If a household sets its reference levels according to the consumption of richer peers (the
rich Joneses) who consume at higher levels and wants to catch up by increasing its reference
levels, then this will decrease its happiness. If, on the other hand, a household compares itself
to poorer peers (the poor Joneses) that consume at lower levels and wants to adapt to the
others by decreasing its reference levels, then this will increase its happiness. So comparing
yourself to richer people makes you less happy while comparing yourself to poorer people
makes you happier.
11See Clark, Frijters and Shields, (2008).
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Some examples of reference consumption levels for Ω > 0
In the following we present some additional interesting examples of reference consumption
levels C¯1 and C¯2.
Example 1 (Merton type expected utility): C¯1 = C¯2 = 0
A special case embedded in this behavioral study is the traditional expected utility (EUT),
where C¯1 = C¯2 = 0 and thus V (Ci) ≡
C1−γi
1−γ for C1, C2 ≥ 0. In this case we solve problem
(P1) and the solution is then identical to (10) and (11) for the prospect theory utility with
C¯1 = C¯2 = 0. Thus, the optimal consumption in the first period is
(C∗1 )
EUT =
1 + rf
1 + rf +M
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
> 0
Note that in this case ΩEUT > Ω > 0, where Ω is related to a prospect theory (PT) household
and we assume that the PT household has at least one consumption reference level strictly
positive, i.e., either C¯1 > 0 or C¯2 > 0, otherwise it boils down to the expected utility case.
EUT optimal consumption is proportional to the present value of endowment income, where
the factor of proportionality, representing the marginal propensity to consume out of the
present value of total income, is less than unity. This marginal propensity to consume (out
of the present value of total income) is the same as the one under PT preferences, assuming
the curvature parameter γ remains unchanged.
In addition,
(α∗)EUT =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(C∗1 )
EUT > 0
and thus the household’s investment in the risky asset is also proportional to the present value
of endowment income.12 However, the EUT household will always invest in the risky asset,
which is not necessarily the case for the PT household when Ω = 0 and thus it will not invest
in the risky financial market. The case when Ω = 0 is discussed in section 4. Note that for
the EUT household the savings, (S∗)EUT = Y1 − (C
∗
1 )
EUT , are positive when MY1 > Y2, in
which case the household transfers some of its first period income into the second period.
Example 2 (comparison to poorer peers): C¯1 +
C¯2
1+rf
= Y P1 +
Y P2
1+rf
< Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
12In comparing optimal consumption and risky asset holdings between the two models one has to be careful
and remember that the types of utility functions suggested by these models are different. For example, the EUT
model implies a constant relative risk aversion, which is equal to γ, while the PT utility shows a decreasing
relative risk aversion, which is equal to γC1/(C1 − C¯1) for C1 6= C¯1 and γC2/(C2 − C¯2) for C2 6= C¯2. In
addition, the relative risk aversion for the EUT model is restricted to be below one (as a consequence from
our restriction on γ, which states 0 < γ < 1), while it has sometimes empirically been found to be larger than
one (see Ahsan and Tsigaris, 2009, who provide some empirical examples).
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In this situation the household with income levels Y1 and Y2 sets its first and second period
consumption reference levels such that its present value of total reference consumption is equal
to the present value of the endowment income stream of some poorer household. By a poorer
household we mean a household whose total discounted endowment income is below the total
discounted endowment income of this household. Namely, Y P1 +
Y P2
1+rf
< Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
, where
Y P1 and Y
P
2 are the first and the second period income levels of the poorer household such
that Y P1 ≥ 0 and Y
P
2 ≥ 0. In this case Ω represents the household’s wealth net of the wealth
of the poorer household, i.e., Ω = (1 + rf )
[
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
(
Y P1 +
Y P2
1+rf
)]
> 0. In other words,
less ambitious households place themselves into the comfort zone by comparing themselves to
peers with a smaller wealth level. The impact of changes in the poorer household’s income on
this household’s consumption and investment behavior were discussed previously as examples
of changes in the reference levels. Note that the EUT model, example 1, is observationally
equivalent to households who compare themselves to people that have no endowment income,
i.e., Y P1 = Y
P
2 = 0.
Example 3 (consumption overreaction to income): C¯1 = C¯+cY1, C¯2 = (1+rf )C¯+cY2
where C¯ ∈
[
−cmin
{
Y1,
Y2
1+rf
}
, 1−c2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
))
and c ∈ (0, 1)
In this case, the consumption reference levels are set such that one part, C¯ or (1 + rf )C¯,
is independent of the household’s current income and the remaining part is a fraction of its
respective income.13 In order to satisfy the Ω = (1 − c) ((1 + rf )Y1 + Y2) − 2(1 + rf )C¯ > 0
assumption we require C¯ < 1−c2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
. In addition we assume C¯ ≥ −cY1 such that
C¯1 ≥ 0 and we assume C¯ ≥ −
c
1+rf
Y2 such that C¯2 ≥ 0. In this model the household increases
reference consumption levels if its endowment income increases, so aspirations increase with
growing income. The optimal first period consumption and investment in the risky asset are
C∗1 =
M − (1 + rf )
1 + rf +M
C¯ +
1 + rf + cM
1 + rf +M
Y1 +
1− c
1 + rf +M
Y2 > C¯1 ,
α∗ =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(C∗1 − C¯1) > 0
Note that now an increase in the first period income has a larger effect on optimal consumption
than in the case when the first period reference level is independent of income. The reason
why marginal propensity to consume is larger is that two effects are operating. First, the
household increases consumption because of the increase in income and second, this effect
is reinforced with an increase in the first period reference level. This situation can thus be
seen as a consumption overreaction to current income changes. Note, in addition, that the
13All the statements made for example 3 would not change qualitatively if one used the same exogenous
part of the reference level in both periods (C¯1 = C¯ + cY1, C¯2 = C¯ + cY2), different fractions of income in the
two periods (C¯1 = C¯ + c1Y1, C¯2 = (1 + rf )C¯ + c2Y2) or the same exogenous part of the reference level and
different fractions of income (C¯1 = C¯ + c1Y1, C¯2 = C¯ + c2Y2).
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marginal propensity to consume (out of the first period income) is less than unity. Risky
investment increases with an increase in the first period income but not as much as it would
without this dependency. An increase in the second period income has similar effects. First,
current period consumption increases but to a lower degree than in the independency case.
Second, investment in the risky asset also increases, and again to a smaller extent than in the
independency case.
If reference levels were set in this way households would be happier with an increase in
the reference level if driven (only) by an increase in current period income. Households would
be less happy, however, if the reference level was increased by a factor that is independent of
the income. This situation is different from the case when reference levels are independent
of income, where an increase in the reference level always decreases happiness. So now an
increasing reference point can have either a positive or a negative effect on the household’s
happiness, depending on the source of the increase.
Example 4 (risky asset overreaction to income): C¯1 = C¯ − cY1, C¯2 = (1 + rf )C¯ − cY2
where C¯ ∈
[
cmax
{
Y1,
Y2
1+rf
}
, 1+c2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
))
and c ∈ (0, 1)
This is the opposite of the previous example with the household reducing the first (second)
period consumption reference level as its first (second) period income increases. Hence the
reference levels depend again partly on income and partly on a factor independent of income
(C¯ or (1 + rf )C¯). For Ω > 0 we assume that C¯ <
1+c
2
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
, and to satisfy the
nonnegativity constraints on C¯1 and C¯2 we require C¯ ≥ cY1 and C¯ ≥
c
1+rf
Y2. The optimal
solution is
C∗1 =
M − (1 + rf )
1 + rf +M
C¯ +
1 + rf − cM
1 + rf +M
Y1 +
1 + c
1 + rf +M
Y2 > C¯1 ,
α∗ =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(C∗1 − C¯1) > 0
In this case the impact from a change in current income on optimal current consumption is
smaller than in the case when the first period reference level is independent of income. This
same impact is also smaller than in the previous example, because the increase in current
income reduces the household’s first period reference level. This indirect effect of current
income on current consumption is negative and would have to be smaller in absolute value
than the direct effect (which is positive) to make first period consumption a normal good.14
Risky investment increases with an increase in current income, and it does so by a larger
degree than when the reference level is independent of income. Hence, the household does
not overreact with respect to current consumption, as in the previous example, but with
14This would be the case, i.e.,
dC∗1
dY1
> 0, if c <
1+rf
M
.
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respect to investment in the risky asset. We call this a risky asset overreaction to current
income changes.
Contrary to the previous example, and similar to cases when the reference levels are
independent of income, the increase of reference levels driven (only) by a decrease of the
income decreases the happiness level, which decreases also if the reference level is increased
by a factor that is independent of the income. So now an increasing reference point will
always have a negative effect on the household’s happiness, independent of the source of the
increase.
4 Balanced reference values relative to endowment income
(Ω = 0)
This case describes the situation when the household adjusts its consumption reference levels
such that they are completely in balance with its total income. In other words, the household’s
present value of endowment income matches exactly the discounted sum of its first and second
period reference consumption levels, i.e., Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
= C¯1 +
C¯2
1+rf
. This occurs when the
household’s goal is to achieve exactly what it can afford based on its endowment income
stream. In this case the household cannot set its reference consumption levels independently
in the first and second periods. It always has to balance the two targets in such a way that
their sum will exactly match the total endowment (after discounting). This means that one
reference level will be a function of the other, yielding
C¯1 = Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
or
C¯2 = (1 + rf ) (Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
Depending on how one looks at it, the household either decides on its second period reference
level and sets the first period reference level accordingly, or it sets the first period reference
level and the second period reference level follows. In the latter case the household’s second
period consumption reference level will be equal to the sum of the second period income
and the amount by which the first period income exceeds consuming at the reference level,
transferred (through the risk-free asset) to the second period.
The dependence between the two reference levels implies that if the household, for some
reason, increases its first period reference level by some given amount then it has to decrease
the second period reference level by (1 + rf ) times this amount, i.e., by the same amount
transferred to second period value terms. If, on the other hand, the household increases
the second period reference level by some amount then it has to decrease its first period
reference level by 1/(1 + rf ) times this amount, i.e., by the same amount discounted to the
first period. The above definitions of the two reference levels together with the upper limits
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on the reference levels given in the problem set-up imply that the reference levels are bound
to be strictly positive, i.e., C¯1 > 0 and C¯2 > 0.
The following proposition presents the household’s optimal choice and states the required
assumptions when reference levels are balanced.
Proposition 2 Let Ω = 0 and λ > max
{(
1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)γ
,
(
M
1+rf
)γ}
. Then problem (5)
obtains a unique maximum at (C∗1 = C¯1, α
∗ = 0).
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
First note that the household has to be sufficiently loss averse in order to make its optimal
choice. In fact the lower bounds on the loss aversion parameter are similar to the case when
the reference levels are low (Ω > 0), adjusted for the fact that Ω = 0.15
If the household is sufficiently loss averse then the first period optimal consumption is
exactly equal to the first period reference consumption, C∗1 = C¯1. In addition, the household
does not invest in the risky asset, α∗ = 0, even though the expected return of the risky asset
exceeds the risk-free return. This is a major difference with respect to the traditional expected
utility model, where the household will always invest in the risky asset if the expected return
of risky asset is greater than the risk-free asset. Note, in addition (see equations (12) and
(13)), that also the second period optimal consumption in both states corresponds to the
second period reference consumption, namely, C∗2g = C
∗
2b = C¯2. The household may still
transfer part of its income from the first period to the second period, or vice versa, in order
to optimize its consumption path, but it will consume exactly at its reference level in both
periods. This is a very particular situation.
In the light of this solution the above restriction that both reference levels must be strictly
positive makes also sense from an economic point of view: assuming that a household lives for
two periods it seems reasonable to require that its consumption is non-zero in both periods,
which is guaranteed by C∗1 = C¯1 > 0 and C
∗
2g = C
∗
2g = C¯2 > 0. It can easily be seen that
the savings, S∗ = m∗ = Y1 − C¯1, are strictly positive if the consumption reference in the first
period is below the first period income, i.e., when C¯1 < Y1, and thus the household wants
to transfer some of its first period income into the second period. To do this the household
will only invest in the risk-free asset and will consume in the second (e.g., retirement) period
the amount of (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) plus any exogenous future income Y2. On the other hand,
savings are negative if the consumption reference in the first period is above the first period
income, i.e., when C¯1 > Y1. In this case the household will transfer some part of its second
period income, namely Y2 − C¯2, into its first period and thus consume in the first period the
amount Y2−C¯21+rf + Y1.
15Two of the previous lower bounds on the loss aversion parameter are now discarded as they are always
smaller than other lower bounds included in the proposition.
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We summarize the results on the sensitivity analysis related to the solution presented
in Proposition 2 in Table 2. It presents the changes of the first and second period optimal
consumption, of the optimal investment in the risky asset, of the consumption gap in the first
and second period, of optimal savings and of happiness (first row) with respect to changes
in the loss aversion parameter and the first and second period consumption reference levels
(first column).
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ d(C∗1 − C¯1) d(C
∗
2g − C¯2) d(C
∗
2b − C¯2) dS
∗ d(E(U(C∗1 , α
∗)))
dλ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dC¯1 1 −(1 + rf ) −(1 + rf ) 0 0 – – -1 0
dC¯2 −
1
1+rf
1 1 0 – 0 0 1
1+rf
0
Table 2: Sensitivity results when aspirations are balanced (Ω = 0)
Similarly as for households with low reference levels an exogenous increase in the loss
aversion parameter, keeping everything else constant, does not affect the solution. Note that
now (Ω = 0) the household cannot set its first and second period reference levels indepen-
dently from each other. So if we want to analyze the effect of an exogenous increase in the
first period consumption reference level, for instance, we also have to consider the result-
ing change (a decrease) in the second period consumption reference level. Taking this into
consideration, an increase in the first period consumption reference will increase first period
optimal consumption, will not affect risky asset holdings (they are always equal to zero) and
will decrease (risk-free) savings. As less income is transferred to the second period, future
consumption will in fact decrease in both states of nature. Following the same argument,
an increase in the second period consumption reference level will increase the second period
optimal consumption and reduce the first period consumption, since more (risk-free) savings
have to be transferred to the second period. The consumption gap is equal to zero in both
periods, so it is not affected by a change in either of the two consumption reference levels.
It can easily be seen that the indirect utility is not affected by either of the two consump-
tion reference levels nor is it affected by the degree of loss aversion (as long as the household
is sufficiently loss averse). I.e., the household’s level of happiness will be insensitive to an
increase of the (first or second period) consumption reference level as well as to any changes
of the degree of loss aversion.
Continuing our following the Joneses example (where the household sets its reference
consumption level according to its neighbor’s consumption), the household actually mimics
the Joneses behavior in the first or the second period, but not necessarily in both periods.
If this household sets its first period reference level according to the Joneses then C∗1 =
C¯1 = C
∗
1,Joneses, so the optimal first period consumption levels of this household and of
the Joneses will be identical, and this household will follow the Joneses in the first period.
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Since the two reference levels are tied together, however, this also means that C∗2 = C¯2 =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C
∗
1,Joneses) + Y2, so this household’s reaction in the second period will be to
decrease (increase) its optimal consumption provided the Joneses increased (decreased) their
consumption in the first period. If, on the other hand, this household sets its second period
reference level according to the Joneses, it mimics the Joneses in the second period in the
following sense: it consumes exactly at the expected optimal consumption of the Joneses,
namely, C∗2 = C¯2 = E(C
∗
2,Joneses), so this household will follow the Joneses in the second
period. Again, since the reference levels are not independent, this means at the same time
that C¯1 = Y1 + (Y2 − E(C
∗
2,Joneses))/(1 + rf ) and hence the household’s reaction in the
first period would be to decrease (increase) its optimal consumption provided the Joneses
increase (decrease) their expected optimal consumption in the second period. In summary,
our results imply that the balanced household follows the Joneses either in the first or in the
second period but not in both, provided that the Joneses change their first and second period
consumption in the same direction, i.e, increase – or alternatively decrease – their (expected)
optimal consumption in both periods.
Some examples of reference consumption levels for Ω = 0
In the following we present some examples worth mentioning for the balanced household.
Example 5: C¯1 = Y1 and C¯2 = Y2
This situation occurs when the household sets its consumption reference levels equal to its
respective incomes in both periods. In this case the household will invest neither in the risky
asset nor in the risk-free asset, so no income is transferred to enable a larger future or current
consumption. The household will totally consume its first period income in the first period
and its second period income in the second period. Thus, households that belong to this
category do not save or borrow anything and rely exclusively on their exogenous income to
consume.
Example 6 (status quo): C¯2 = (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) and Y2 = 0
In this case, the second period consumption reference level is set equal to the gross return
of investing the first period endowment income net of the first period consumption reference
level which can be considered as the counterpart to reference levels in one-period models,
which are equal to the gross return from investing all initial wealth into the risk-free asset.16
In our case the initial wealth would correspond to Y1 − C¯1. In addition, Y2 = 0, i.e., the
household does not receive any exogenous second period income (as in one-period models).
16See Hlouskova and Tsigaris (2012).
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5 High reference values relative to endowment income (Ω < 0)
Now we consider the case when the household sets its consumption reference levels such that
the present value is above the present value of its endowment income. This is done when the
household has high aspirations. Let us first introduce the following notation
M1(λ) = k
[
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]
(14)
c˜P2 =
(rg − rb)(−Ω)
(rg − rf )C¯2
(15)
C¯P22 =
rg − rb
rf − rb
(
(1 + rf )
(
Y1 − C¯1
)
+ Y2
)
(16)
δ+ =
1
1− p
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf )(rg − rb)
]1−γ
(17)
k =
[
δ(1 + rf )(1− p)
(
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ] 1γ
(18)
k2 =
[
δ(1 + rf )p
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
)1−γ] 1γ
(19)
Note that M1(λ) is an increasing function in λ and if λ ≥
1
Kγ
then M1(λ) ≥ 0. A simple
derivation shows that λ >
1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
is sufficient for M1(λ) > 1 + rf . Note in addition
that for C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 is c˜
P2 < 1.
We introduce an additional notation
λˆ =


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
=


k
(
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
(20)
λΩ<01 =


1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
1− c˜P2


γ
if C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 (21)
λΩ<02 = λˆ

 C¯1
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf


γ
(22)
λ˜Ω<0 =
1
p

1
δ
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1+rf
C¯2
)1−γ
− (1− p)
(
1− c˜P2
)
λΩ<01

 if C¯2 < C¯P22 (23)
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The following proposition presents the household’s optimal choice and states the required
assumptions for high reference values relative to endowment income.
Proposition 3 Let Ω < 0, C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 and λ > max
{
λΩ<01 , λ
Ω<0
2 , λ˜
Ω<0
}
. Then the following
holds
C∗1 =


CP21 = C¯1 +
−Ω
M1(λ)−1−rf
> C¯1 if δ ≤ δ
+
0 < CP51 =
(
Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
)
λ
1
γ −C¯1λˆ
1
γ
λ
1
γ −λˆ
1
γ
< C¯1 if δ > δ
+


(24)
α∗ =


αP2 =
((
1
K0
) 1
γ
+λ
1
γ
)
k
rg−rf
(C∗1 − C¯1) > 0 if δ ≤ δ
+
αP5 =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf−rb+K
1
γ
0 (rg−rf )
λˆ
1
γ
λ
1
γ −λˆ
1
γ
(−Ω) > 0 if δ > δ+


(25)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 is derived for a relatively low17 second period reference level, C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 , and
for a sufficiently loss averse household, λ ≥ max
{
λΩ<01 , λ
Ω<0
2 , λ˜
Ω<0
}
. The fact that Ω < 0
implies that the household’s aspirations are high, which should make it more difficult to exceed
the consumption reference levels than when the household’s aspirations are low. So, even if
the utility is such that consumption below the reference level is heavily penalized (large values
of the loss aversion parameter λ) we cannot expect optimal consumption levels to exceed their
reference levels at all times. This is indeed what we observe: in the first solution the second
period optimal consumption in the bad state of nature is below its reference level, while in
the second solution the first period optimal consumption is below its reference level. The first
solution is denoted by superscript P2, which refers to problem (P2) where the solution was
reached, and the second solution is denoted by superscript P5, which refers to problem (P5)
where the solution was reached, see Appendix A. Thus, when the household’s aspirations are
set above the present value of the endowment income, a relative loss (either in the first or
second period) cannot be avoided.
Unlike households with low aspirations, we now have two different solutions, denoted(
CP21 , α
P2
)
and
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
,18 and which one applies depends on the rate δ at which future
utility is discounted. The first solution applies to households with lower discount factors
17Note that households cannot set arbitrarily high reference levels for a given endowment income.
18Again, for the proof of the household’s consumption decision we split problem (5) into eight separate
problems, (P1)–(P8), which differ in the respective domains of feasible solutions. These domains are specified
by whether (first and second period, good and bad state of nature) consumption is above or below the respective
reference level. See Appendix A.
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(δ ≤ δ+), which put relatively more emphasis on the well-being in the present and near
future and thus display a high time preference, while the second applies to households with
higher discount factors (δ > δ+), which care relatively more about the distant future and
discount future utility at a lower rate and thus show a low time preference. The threshold
value δ+ separating the two types is a function of the rates rf , rg and rb, of the probability
of the good state of nature p and of the curvature parameter γ, see equation (17). Note that
it is increasing in p and γ while it is decreasing in rf , all other things equal. The restriction
δ > δ+ only yields feasible candidates for the discount factor, which is bound to be below
one, if δ+ < 1. This is the case when the probability of the good state is not too large.19
We will discuss the two solutions separately starting with
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
. First note that the
optimal consumption in the first period is strictly above the consumption reference level. As
the solution
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
is reached in problem (P2) the optimal consumption in the second
period is above the reference level C¯2 in the good state of nature, C
P2
2g > C¯2, and below C¯2
in the bad state of nature, CP22b < C¯2. Thus, the household cannot avoid a relative loss if the
bad state of nature materializes. Further, the optimal investment in the risky asset is strictly
positive. Like in the case for households with low aspirations, savings can be either positive
or negative in general.20 If, however, the household’s consumption reference level is equal to
or above its income in the first period21 then optimal savings are always negative, i.e., the
household will transfer future income to the present period in order to satisfy its optimal
consumption path. Given that optimal risky investment is positive, borrowing in the risk-free
market has to be sufficiently large then, in order to produce negative savings. In fact, in this
situation of negative savings the household will invest in the risky asset in order to (partially)
fund the borrowing and thus the income transfer from the second to the first period. If in one
period the household’s income is below the consumption reference level and vice versa in the
other period, then the answer to the question whether optimal savings are positive depends
(also) on the loss aversion parameter. Keeping everything else constant, a larger loss aversion
parameter will increase savings (see below). Note that the optimal savings of a household
with low aspirations did not depend on the loss aversion parameter.
For CP21 and α
P2 given by (24) and (25) the following holds:
(i) limλ→∞C
P2
1 = C¯1
(ii) limλ→∞C
P2
2g = C¯2
(iii) limλ→∞C
P2
2b =
rf−rb
rg−rf
(
C¯P22 − C¯2
)
< C¯2
19More precisely, p < 1−
(
1
1+rf
rg−rf
rg−rb
)1−γ
is needed in order to guarantee δ+ < 1. Note that there is always
a solution for p as the term in the brackets is smaller than one.
20The assumption required for S∗ > 0 is M1(λ)(Y1 − C¯1) > −(Y2 − C¯2).
21This condition is sufficient but not necessary.
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(iv) limλ→∞ α
P2 = −Ωrg−rf ≤ α
P2
The following table summarizes the results on the sensitivity analysis of optimal consump-
tion in both periods, optimal risky investment, the consumption gap in both periods, optimal
savings and happiness (first row) with respect to the loss aversion parameter λ and the first
and second period consumption reference levels C¯1 and C¯2 (first column).
dCP21 dC
P2
2g dC
P2
2b dα
P2 d(CP21 − C¯1) d(C
P2
2g − C¯2) d(C¯2 − C
P2
2b ) dS
P2 dE(U(CP21 , α
P2))
dλ < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
dC¯1 > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 – – < 0 < 0
dC¯2 > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 – > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
Table 3: Sensitivity results when aspirations are high (Ω < 0): solution
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
As opposed to households with low aspirations the optimal consumption and optimal
investment in the risky asset of households with high aspirations are sensitive with respect to
the loss aversion parameter λ. An exogenous increase in the loss aversion parameter, keeping
everything else constant, will decrease the first and the second period optimal consumption in
the good state of nature, decrease the investment in the risky asset, increase savings and thus
increase the investment in the risk-free asset. In addition, increased loss aversion decreases
the consumption gap in both periods. Also the happiness level decreases with increasing loss
aversion, i.e., more loss averse households are less happy than less loss averse households.
An exogenous increase in the first period consumption reference level, keeping everything
else constant, will increase the first period optimal consumption as well as the second period
optimal consumption in the good state (which is above the consumption reference level) and
the investment in the risky asset, but will decrease the second period optimal consumption
in the bad state (which is below the consumption reference level). At the same time the
household will decrease optimal savings, which actually implies the observed decrease in
optimal consumption in bad state of nature. Not only does optimal consumption rise in the
first period and in the good state in the second period, but also the corresponding relative
optimal consumption rises. Note that the household’s happiness decreases with an increasing
consumption reference level, i.e., more ambitious households are less happy than less ambitious
ones. An exogenous increase in the second period consumption reference level yields exactly
the same sensitivities in terms of signs as an increase in the first period consumption reference
level.
Continuing our previous example, where the household compares its optimal consumption
to its neighbor’s consumption level we see that the household again follows the Joneses in
the first period.22 However, contrary to the case when Ω > 0 the household does not reduce
the consumption gap but widens this gap. This means that the household increases its
22Assuming the household increases its first period reference level as a response to an increase of the Joneses’
first period consumption, it will also increase its optimal consumption in the first period.
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consumption even more than the Joneses do. A household with high aspirations reacts thus
more intensely than one with low aspirations, even though both follow the Joneses.
As in the case when Ω > 0, it is not clear whether the household follows the Joneses in
the second period, since its second period consumption in the good and the bad states of
nature responds in opposite directions to the change in its second period reference level, and
thus it is not clear whether the expected household’s consumption will reflect an increase or
a decrease of consumption. In addition in the second period, in both the good and the bad
states of nature, the consumption gap will widen in response to an increase in the second
period reference level. This, however, implies a decrease of the optimal consumption when it
is below the reference level, which is the case in the bad state of nature.
Note, finally, that an infinitely loss averse household will optimally consume the consump-
tion reference level in the first period and in the second period in the good state of nature,
it will have strictly positive optimal consumption below its reference level in the bad state of
nature and will invest the strictly positive amount of −Ω/(rg − rf ) in the risky asset.
We now turn to the discussion of the second solution of Proposition 3,
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
, which
holds for households with a low time preference, i.e., for households with a high discount
factor δ > δ+. As the notation suggests, this solution is reached in problem (P5), where the
first and second period consumption domains are given by 0 ≤ C1 ≤ C¯1 and C2g ≥ C2b ≥ C¯2.
The optimal consumption in the first period is thus below the reference level and the optimal
consumption in the second period is above the reference level C¯2 in both states of nature.
Even though the household is rather loss averse (and so the penalty for consumption below
the reference level is rather large) the optimal consumption in the first period is below the
consumption reference level. With a sufficiently low time preference, i.e., a sufficiently high
discount factor δ > δ+, the household values future consumption so much that it prefers to
consume above the reference level in both states of nature in the second period, accepting to
consume below the reference level in the first period. Again the optimal investment in the
risky asset is strictly positive.
As in the first solution, savings can be either positive or negative in general.23 If, however,
the household sets its consumption reference level equal to or below its income in the first
period24 then optimal savings are always positive, i.e., the household transfers current income
to the future period in order to satisfy its optimal consumption path. Note that a larger
loss aversion parameter will decrease savings while before (in the first solution) it increased
savings.
For the solution
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
the following holds:
(i) limλ→∞C
P5
1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
< C¯1
23The assumption required for S∗ > 0 is λˆ1/γ(Y1 − C¯1) < −λ
1/γ Y2−C¯2
1+rf
.
24This condition is sufficient but not necessary.
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(ii) limλ→∞C
P5
2g = C¯2
(iii) limλ→∞C
P5
2b = C¯2
(iv) limλ→∞ α
P5 = 0
The following table summarizes the results on the sensitivity analysis of optimal consump-
tion in both periods, optimal risky investment, the consumption gap in both periods, optimal
savings and happiness (first row) with respect to the loss aversion parameter λ and the first
and second period consumption reference levels C¯1 and C¯2 (first column).
dCP51 dC
P5
2g dC
P5
2b dα
P5 d(C¯1 − C
P5
1 ) d(C
P5
2g − C¯2) d(C
P5
2b − C¯2) dS
P5 dE(U(CP51 , α
P5))
dλ > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
dC¯1 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 – – > 0 < 0
dC¯2 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 – > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
Table 4: Sensitivity results when aspirations are high (Ω < 0): solution
(
CP51 , α
P5
)
Again, as for households with a higher time preference (i.e., a lower discount factor), the
optimal consumption and optimal investment in the risky asset are sensitive with respect to
the loss aversion parameter λ. An exogenous increase in the loss aversion parameter, keeping
everything else constant, will increase first period optimal consumption (which is below the
reference level), and decrease everything else, i.e., the second period optimal consumption in
both states of nature (which is above the reference level), the investment in the risky asset,
savings, the consumption gaps in both periods as well as the level of happiness.
An exogenous increase in the first period consumption reference level, keeping everything
else constant, will decrease the first period optimal consumption and thus increase optimal
savings, and, additionally, increase the consumption in the second period in both states of
nature as well as investment in the risky asset. The level of happiness will again decrease
with an increasing reference level and thus more ambitious households are less happy than the
less ambitious ones. The sensitivity analysis with respect to the second period consumption
reference level (of all variables under consideration) is – in terms of signs – the same as with
respect to the first period consumption reference level.
Putting this into the context of following the Joneses we observe the following: the house-
hold does not follow the Joneses in the first period while it indeed follows the Joneses in the
second period. In addition, in the first period the household’s optimal consumption does not
only move in the opposite direction with respect to that of the Joneses also the consumption
gap increases. Note that – as in the first solution and contrary to the case when Ω > 0 –
the household increases its consumption even to a larger degree than the Joneses, provided it
does follow the Joneses. So households react stronger when they have high aspirations than
when they have low aspirations: in following the Joneses, households increase their optimal
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consumption even more than the Joneses do (i.e., they widen their consumption gaps). This
is true in the first period for households with a higher time preference and it is true in the
second period for households with a lower time preference.
Note, finally, that an infinitely loss averse household will optimally consume the first period
income plus the discounted relative consumption (i.e., the difference between the second period
income and the second period consumption reference level). It will consume at the reference
level in the second period in both states of nature and it will only invest in the risk-free asset.
Comparison to richer peers: Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
< Y R1 +
Y R2
1+rf
= C¯1 +
C¯2
1+rf
In this situation the household with income levels Y1 and Y2 sets its first and second period
consumption references such that the total reference consumption is equal to the total income
of some richer household (in the first or second period’s value terms). By a richer household we
mean a household whose total income is larger than the total income of this household; namely,
Y R1 +
Y R2
1+rf
> Y1+
Y2
1+rf
, where Y R1 and Y
R
2 are the first and the second period income levels of
the richer household such that Y R1 > 0 and Y
R
2 ≥ 0. In this case Ω represents the household’s
total income relative to the total income of the richer household, i.e., Ω = (1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 −(
(1 + rf )Y
R
1 + Y
R
2
)
< 0. In other words, more ambitious households place themselves into
the discomfort zone by comparing themselves to peers with a higher total income. The impact
of changes in the rich person’s consumption on this household’s consumption and investment
were discussed previously in the sensitivity analysis.
6 Concluding remarks and future extensions
We can conclude from this study that reference levels and loss aversion play a very important
role in determining not only optimal portfolio decisions, as has been found in the literature
until now,25 but also in determining inter-temporal decisions on current and future consump-
tion levels, which depend on the total savings transferred and the risky investment activity
undertaken. One-period models, investigated to date, impose the assumption that current
consumption is fixed at a certain level and hence the household invests the exogenous initial
wealth to the safe and the risky assets. In this model current consumption and savings are
not fixed but optimally selected by the household, which generalizes the one-period model
to a two-period model that can be thought of as a life cycle model. The optimal solutions
depend on the household’s choice of the present value of the reference levels relative to the
present value of its endowment incomes.
If the present value of the consumption reference levels is lower than the present value
of the endowment income (Ω > 0) then the household behaves in such a way to avoid any
relative losses, both in the current period and in any future states of nature (good or bad).
25See Hlouskova and Tsigaris (2012) for a literature review.
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As a consequence the degree of loss aversion does not directly affect optimal consumption
and risk taking activity. But loss aversion is needed to be sufficiently high to prevent relative
losses. On the other hand, also reference consumption levels play a significant role in affecting
consumption and risk taking activity. People often compare their own income or consumption
levels to that of others and hence use reference levels determined by other people’s income,
wealth or consumption. We find that following others in wanting to consume more may
actually hurt households and make them less happy. However, if the reference level depends
on endowment income this is not always true, in particular when reference levels increase with
growing income. In the first period we observe that the prospect theory household follows
what the Joneses are doing if the reference level is set equal to the consumption level of
the Joneses. In the second period, however, the household does not (necessarily) follow the
Joneses. In both periods, the gap between the household’s consumption and reference level
shrinks as the reference level increases. In addition, if the consumption reference levels are
increased then the investment in the risky asset is reduced.
On the other hand, if the discounted present value of the consumption reference levels
coincides with the present value of the endowment income, i.e., the household sets its reference
levels such that they are in balance with its total income (Ω = 0) then the household’s optimal
consumption is the reference consumption in both periods, and the investment in the risky
asset is zero. In addition, the household follows the Joneses only and exactly in one period,
either in the first one (and not in the second) or in the second one (and not in the first). Also
being more ambitious will not make the household more happy, e.g., when it compares itself
to richer households. In fact, just the opposite is true: households that are more ambitious
are less happy.
Finally, if the present value of the consumption reference levels is higher than the present
value of the endowment income (Ω < 0) then the household cannot avoid experiencing a rela-
tive loss, either today or in the future. As a result, loss aversion directly affects consumption
and risky investment. Here, too, the reference levels play an important role in affecting the
household’s behavior. For example, in half of the cases the household will follow the Joneses
if the reference levels are equal to the consumption levels of the Joneses. However, in this
case the gap between the household’s optimal consumption and its reference level widens as
the reference level increases.
If a prospect theory household is more ambitious, i.e., if it increases its consumption ref-
erence level, this will decrease its happiness. And this is equally true for all three types of
households, those with low, balanced and high aspirations. On the other hand, households
with low and high aspirations differ completely in their following the Joneses behavior, pro-
vided they do follow the Joneses. While households with low aspirations follow the Joneses
only under-proportionately (i.e., they increase their optimal consumption to a lower degree
than the Joneses) households with high aspirations follow the Joneses over-proportionately
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(i.e., they increase their optimal consumption even more than the Joneses do).
There are a number of extensions that might be worth undertaking in the future. One
could be to introduce uncertainty in the second period exogenous income instead of uncer-
tainty in the returns of the risky asset. Another extension could be to consider an endogenous
second period consumption reference instead of considering it exogenous, as we did in this
study.26 For example, the second period consumption reference level could be a weighted av-
erage of the first period reference level and the first period consumption (habit persistence).
Still another extension could be to develop a model where the utility includes consumption
reference levels directly (and not only through relative consumption) in order to give house-
holds not only disutility but also pleasure from having them to compare. Households would
then select the reference levels endogenously by setting the marginal benefit equal to the
marginal cost. Finally, one could explore the impact of taxation on the decisions to take risk
and to consume today. This could be either a tax on the exogenous endowment income or a
tax on capital income or a tax on both.
26This feature, however, allowed us to investigate certain types of reference levels which could not have been
done otherwise.
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Appendix A: Optimization problems
There are eight cases to consider in proofs of lemmas 1 and 2 when α ≥ 0:
(P1) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2b ≥ C¯2 and C2g ≥ C¯2
(P2) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2b ≤ C¯2 and C2g ≥ C¯2
(P3) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2b ≥ C¯2 and C2g ≤ C¯2
(P4) C1 ≥ C¯1, C2b ≤ C¯2 and C2g ≤ C¯2
(P5) C1 ≤ C¯1, C2b ≥ C¯2 and C2g ≥ C¯2
(P6) C1 ≤ C¯1, C2b ≤ C¯2 and C2g ≥ C¯2
(P7) C1 ≤ C¯1, C2b ≥ C¯2 and C2g ≤ C¯2
(P8) C1 ≤ C¯1, C2b ≤ C¯2 and C2g ≤ C¯2
The corresponding problems are
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ + δp
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rg−rf )α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1− p)
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rf−rb)α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α
max
{
0,− Ωrg−rf
}
≤ α ≤ Ωrf−rb


(P1)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ + δp
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rg−rf )α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rf−rb)α)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α
max
{
0, −Ωrg−rf
}
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
= Ω+C¯2rf−rb


(P2)
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To guarantee that −Ωrg−rf ≤
Ω+C¯2
rf−rb
the condition C¯2 ≤ C¯
P2
2 ≡
rg−rb
rf−rb
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
)
needs to be satisfied.27
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ − λδp
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rg−rf )α)
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1 − p)
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rf−rb)α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α
0 ≤ α ≤ min
{
0, Ωrf−rb
}


(P3)
Note that the only feasible solution is
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
when Ω > 0 and
(
C1 = C¯1, α = 0
)
when Ω = 0. There is no feasible solution when Ω < 0.
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
(C1−C¯1)1−γ
1−γ − λδp
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rg−rf )α)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rf−rb)α)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α ≤ C1
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α
0 ≤ α ≤ C¯2rg−rb


(P4)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ + δp
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rg−rf )α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1 − p)
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rf−rb)α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : 0 ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, C¯1
}
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2−C¯2
rf−rb
=
Ω+(1+rf )C1
rf−rb


(P5)
27Note that the condition on C¯2 follows from the constraint C2b ≥ 0 given by C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α.
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Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ + δp
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rg−rf )α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rf−rb)α)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α
0 ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, C¯1
}
max
{
0, Ωrf−rb
}
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2
rf−rb


(P6)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ − λδp
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rg−rf )α)
1−γ
1−γ
+δ(1 − p)
((1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rf−rb)α+Y2−C¯2)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, C¯1
}
0 ≤ α ≤ min
{
0,− Ωrg−rf
}


(P7)
Note that the only feasible solution is
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
when Ω < 0 and
(
C1 = C¯1, α = 0
)
when Ω = 0. There is no feasible solution when Ω > 0.
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) =
−λ (C¯1−C1)
1−γ
1−γ − λδp
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)−(rg−rf )α)
1−γ
1−γ
−λδ(1− p)
(C¯2−Y2−(1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(rf−rb)α)
1−γ
1−γ
such that : Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ min
{
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, C¯1
}
0 ≤ α ≤ − Ωrg−rf


(P8)
Appendix B: Ω ≥ 0
Before proceeding further, we introduce the following notation
M = k
[
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]
= k2
[
1 +K
1
γ
γ
]
= k + k2
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In addition notice that
kγ = Kγk
γ
2 (26)
K
1
γ
0 +K
1
γ
γ =
rg − rb
r − rb
K
1
γ
0 =
rg − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
γ
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
=
(
1
K0
) 1
γ rg − rb
rg − rf
where k and k2 are defined by (18) and (19).
Lemma 1 Let C¯1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, i.e., Ω ≥ 0 and λ > max
{
1
Kγ
, λΩ≥0,
(
M
1+rf
)γ}
. Then
problem (5) obtains a unique maximum at (C∗1 , α
∗) where
C∗1 = C¯1 +
Ω
1 + rf +M
= C¯1 +
1 + rf
1 + rf +M
[(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)
−
(
C¯1 +
C¯2
1 + rf
)]
≥ C¯1 (27)
α∗ =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
M
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(C∗1 − C¯1) ≥ 0 (28)
Proof. We proceed in two steps. At first we assume that C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and then
C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Note that as we assume that C¯1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, i.e., Ω ≥ 0, then in case
C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
only problems (P1)–(P4) are feasible.
Problem (P1). Note at first that there is no feasible solution for (P1) if C1 > Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
.
If C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
then the only feasible solution is
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
. Let C1 <
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. At first we solve the concave programming problem (P1) as an unconstrained
problem, i.e., we solve two equations in two unknown variables C1 and α, namely
dE(U)
dC1
= 0
and dE(U)dα = 0 (∇E(U) = 0), obtain the optimum solution (C
∗
1 , α
∗) and finally verify that
C∗2b ≥ C¯2 and C
∗
2g ≥ C¯2, C
∗
1 ≥ C¯1 and −
Ω
rg−rf
≤ α∗ ≤ Ωrf−rb , i.e. that the solution is also
feasible.
The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dC1
= (C1 − C¯1)
−γ −δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rg − rf )α+ Y2 − C¯2
]−γ
(1 + rf )
−δ(1− p)
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rf − rb)α+ Y2 − C¯2
]−γ
(1 + rf ) = 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rg − rf )α+ Y2 − C¯2
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−δ(1− p)
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rf − rb)α+ Y2 − C¯2
]−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(29)
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dE(U)
dα = 0 from (29) implies the following
p
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rf − rb)α+ Y2 − C¯2
]γ
(rg − rf )
= (1− p)
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 −C1) + (rg − rf )α+ Y2 − C¯2
]γ
(rf − rb)
which after using the definition of Kγ as given by (7) gives
K
− 1
γ
0
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rf − rb)α+ Y2 − C¯2
]
= (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rg − rf )α+ Y2 − C¯2
This implies that
α =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
((1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2) (30)
If we plug the last expression for α into the C1 part of the FOC in (29) we obtain
(C1 − C¯1)
−γ
δ(1 + rf )
= p

Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1) + (1−K
1
γ
0 )(rg − rf )
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1)
)
−γ
+ (1− p)

Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1)− (1−K
1
γ
0 )(rf − rb)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1)
)
−γ
=

 rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )(
Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1)
)
(rg − rb)


γ [
p
(
1−K−10
)
+K−10
]
(31)
with assuming that Ω− (1 + rf )(C1 − C¯1) > 0 which is equivalent to C1 < Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
.
After some simplifications we obtain
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 = (C1 − C¯1)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
[
δ(1 + rf )p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ
= (C1 − C¯1)M (32)
which gives C1 = C
∗
1 ≥ C¯1. Note that (27) and the assumption Ω ≥ 0 imply that C
∗
1 ≥ C¯1. In
addition, after plugging C∗1 into (30) we obtain α
∗ as given in (28). Note that C∗1 < Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and α∗ ≥ 0 as K0 < 1 (which follows from E(r) > rf ).
Using (29), it is easy to verify that d
2
E(U)
dC21
< 0, d
2
E(U)
dα2
< 0, and ∇2E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2 −
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
> 0 and thus problem (P1) is a concave programming problem and
(C∗1 , α
∗) is its unique global maximum.
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Finally, C∗2g and C
∗
2b can be written as
C∗2g = C¯2 +
MΩ
(1 + rf +M)
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
) rg − rb
rf − rb
C∗2b = C¯2 +
MΩ
(1 + rf +M)
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
) rg − rb
rf − rb
K
1
γ
0
and thus they both are such that C∗2g ≥ C¯2 and C
∗
2b ≥ C¯2 as K0 ≥ 0 and rb < rf < rg.
It can be shown that
(1− γ)E(U(C∗1 , α
∗)) =
(
Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ (
1 +
M
1 + rf
)γ
=
Ω1−γ
1 + rf
(1 + rf +M)
γ (33)
As we have already mentioned the only feasible solution for C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
with
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
, 0
))
=
(
Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ
(34)
which is below the value of the expected utility function at (C∗1 , α
∗
1), see (33), as M > 0.
Thus, the maximum of (P1) is reached at (C∗1 , α
∗).
If Ω = 0 then definition of problem (P1) implies that the only feasible solution is (C1, α) =
(C¯1, 0) which is then also the maximum. I.e., (C
∗
1 , α
∗) = (C¯1, 0) and C
∗
2b = C
∗
2g = C¯2 ≥ 0.
Note in addition that E(U(C∗1 , α
∗)) = 0.
Next we show that for Ω ≥ 0 and C1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
all possible candidates for maximum in
problems (P2), (P3) and (P4) are also feasible solutions of (P1) and as the expected utilities
of problems (P2), (P3) and (P4) in these points coincide with the expected utility of (P1)
then utility of (P1) at (C∗1 , α
∗) exceeds utility functions of problems (P2), (P3) and (P4) at
their feasible solutions.
Problem (P2). Let C1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. From the proof of Proposition 3 (problem (P2)) it
can be seen that its stationary point exists only for C1 > Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, so there are no stationary
points when C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Note that the utility of (P2) is a decreasing function in α for
any fixed C1
dE(U)
dα
= δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(rf − rb) < 0
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if
λ >
p(rg − rf )
(1− p)(rf − rb)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]γ
The latter is achieved if
1
Kγ
≥
p(rg − rf )
(1− p)(rf − rb)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]γ
(35)
as it is assumed that λ > 1Kγ where Kγ is given by (7). It can be shown that (35) is satisfied
if C1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+r which is our assumption. In addition, the set of feasible solutions for (P2)
can be written as
C¯1 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf(
C2b ≤ C¯2 ⇒
)
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α (⇐ C2b ≥ 0)
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb

(36)
Let C˜1 be fixed and such that C¯1 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Based on the first inequality in the
second row of (36) and the fact that the utility of (P2) is decreasing in α for given C1 = C˜1,
the smallest possible α = α˜ such that (C˜1, α˜) remains feasible is given by
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α˜ = C˜1
and thus C˜2b = C¯2 and
α˜ =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2
rf − rb
∈
[
0,
Ω
rf − rb
]
Note that (C˜1, α˜) completes also the second inequality in (36), namely: C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
Y1 + C˜1 −
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
= C˜1 +
C¯2
1+rf
i.e., C˜2b = C¯2 ≥ 0, as C¯2 ≥ 0. Thus, for any given C˜1 that
satisfies C¯1 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is the point
(
C˜1,
(1+rf )(Y1−C˜1)+Y2−C¯2
rf−rb
)
where the utility of
(P2) achieves its maxima. As point (C˜1, α˜) is feasible also for (P1) and as utilities of (P1)
and (P2) coincide at this point then the utility function of (P1) at (C∗1 , α
∗) is bigger or equal
to the utility function of (P2) at any point (C˜1, α˜).
Note that for C˜1 = Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is α˜ = 0 and point
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
is feasible also for (P1)
and for Ω = 0 is the maximum reached at (C¯1, 0).
Let C1 ≥ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
≥ C¯1. From the proof of Proposition 3 (problem (P2)) it can be seen
that its stationary point (which is the same as in this case) happens to be (CP21 , α
P2), see (24).
For Ω > 0 is this stationary point infeasible for (P2) as CP21 < C¯1 and thus the maximum will
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occur at the border. The feasible solutions at the border for (P2) that come into consideration
are given by: (i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = 0 and (iv) C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. On the
other hand, for Ω = 0 the stationary point is C¯1, 0 and the utility function at this point can
also be compared to the value of the utility function at the feasible solutions at the border.
Case (i). C2g = C¯2 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α and 0 ≤ α ≤ C¯2rg−rb . It can be seen
that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α,α
))
=
(
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γα1−γ (37)
and thus the potential maximum occurs either at α = 0 or α = C¯2rg−rb or at the stationary point
of function given by (37) which can be easily derived and has the value α = α¯ ≡ λ
1
γ k
1+rf−λ
1
γ k
Ω
rg−rf
when λ <
(
1+rf
k
)γ
. For λ ≥
(
1+rf
k
)γ
is function (37) decreasing in α and thus the maximum
occurs at α = 0 where point
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
is feasible also for (P1). Note in addition that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α¯, α¯
))
=
Ω1−γ
1 + rf
(
1 + rf − λ
1
γ k
)γ
≤
(
Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ
= (1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
, 0
))
when λ <
(
1+rf
k
)γ
and thus point
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α¯, α¯
)
can not be a maximum.
Regarding the end-point α = C¯2rg−rb , one can see that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
rg − rb
C¯2
1 + rf
, α =
C¯2
rg − rb
))
=

Ω+ rg−rfrg−rb C¯2
1 + rf


1−γ
− λδ(1− p) C¯1−γ2
≤
Ω1−γ
1 + rf
(1 + rf +M)
γ = (1− γ)E (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
if
λ ≥ λ˜ ≡
Ω1−γ
δ(1 − p)(1 + rf )C¯
1−γ
2
[
(1 + rf )
γ
(
1 +
rg − rf
rg − rb
C¯2
Ω
)1−γ
− (1 + rf +M)
γ
]
(38)
As we assume that λ > λΩ>0, see (9), then (38) holds as λΩ>0 ≥ λ˜.
There is no feasible solution for case (ii), i.e., when C2b = C¯2.
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Case (iii). C2b = 0 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and C¯2rg−rb ≤ α ≤
C¯2
rf−rb
. It can be seen
that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α,α
))
=
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
)1−γ
+ δp
(
(rg − rb)α − C¯2
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)C¯1−γ2
(39)
As function (39) is concave in α the maximum is reached at the stationary point α¯, i.e.
dE
(
U
(
Y1+
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α,α
))
dα
∣∣∣
α=α¯
= 0 which is given as follows
α¯ =
k2((1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2) +
rf−rb
rg−rb
(1 + rf )C¯2
(1 + rf + k2)(rf − rb)
=
1 + rf
1 + rf + k2
C¯2
rg − rb
+
k2
1 + rf + k2
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
rf − rb
The expected utility is at this point is given by
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α¯, α¯
))
=
(1 + rf + k2)
γ
1 + rf
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 −
rf − rb
rg − rb
C¯2
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)C¯1−γ2 (40)
If λ > λΩ>0, see (9), then the utility given by (40) will be below the utility of (P1) at its
maximum, which is given by Ω
1−γ
1+rf
(1 + rf +M)
γ , see (33).
Case (iv). C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
for 0 ≤ α ≤ C¯2rf−rb with the utility function being
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
α,α
))
=
(
Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ
+ δp(rg − rf )
1−γα1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)(rf − rb)
1−γα1−γ
which is decreasing in α for λ > 1Kγ and thus the maximum is reached at
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
which is feasible also for (P1).
It follows from the proof above that for Ω = 0 the maximum, for λ >
(
1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)γ
,
is achieved at (C1 = C¯1, α = 0) where the value of the expected utility is zero.
Problem (P3). The only feasible solution is
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
which is feasible also for
(P1).
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The set of feasible solutions for problem (P4)
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
1
1 + rf
(rg − rf )α ≤ C1
implies C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. The other set of feasible solutions
C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
gives C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
, which implies that Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
.
The only feasible solution for C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is (C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0) at which the
utility function is below the utility function at (C∗1 , α
∗).
Let C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. As d
2
E(U)
dα2
> 0 then there is no local interior maximum which
implies that the maximum will occur at the border. The cases when this could happen are:
(i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2g = 0 and (iv) C2b = 0. Note that case (i) coincides with
case (i) when proving (P2) and the only feasible solution in case (ii) is (C1 = Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0)
which is feasible for (P1).
Case (iii). The only feasible solution for C2g = 0 is (C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
, α = 0) with the
utility function being
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
, 0
))
=
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
− λδC¯1−γ2
which is dealt in case (iv) below.
Case (iv). C2b = 0 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and 0 ≤ α ≤ C¯2rg−rb and thus
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α,α
))
=
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α
)1−γ
−λδp
(
C¯2 − (rg − rb)α
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p) C¯1−γ2 (41)
The potential candidates for maximum are α = 0, α = C¯2rg−rb and α = α¯ where α¯ is a unique
stationary point such that dE(U)dα
∣∣∣
α=α¯
= 0 where
α¯ =
(λδp(rg − rb))
1
γ
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
−
(
rf−rb
1+rf
) 1
γ
C¯2
(λδp(rg − rb))
1
γ
rf−rb
1+rf
−
(
rf−rb
1+rf
) 1
γ
(rg − rb)
Note that Ω ≥ 0 and rf > 0 imply that α¯ >
C¯2
rg−rb
and thus infeasible. For α = C¯2rg−rb is
C2g = C¯2 and thus the point
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
C¯2
rg−rb
, α = C¯2rg−rb
)
is feasible for (P2).
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Finally, we show that the utility function at α = 0 is below the utility function at (C∗1 , α
∗).
Namely
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
−λδC¯1−γ2 =
(
Ω+ C¯2
1 + rf
)1−γ
−λδC¯1−γ2 ≤
(
Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ (
1 +
M
1 + rf
)γ
which holds if
λ >
Ω1−γ
δ(1 + rf )C¯
1−γ
2
[(
1 +
C¯2
Ω
)1−γ
(1 + rf )
γ − (1 + rf +M)
γ
]
The last inequality holds as λ > λΩ≥0 and
λΩ≥0 >
Ω1−γ
δ(1 + rf )C¯
1−γ
2
[(
1 +
C¯2
Ω
)1−γ
(1 + rf )
γ − (1 + rf +M)
γ
]
For Ω = 0 the conclusions obtained in (P2) apply, i.e., if
λ >
(
1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)γ
then maximum is reached at (C1 = C¯1, α = 0).
Regarding problem (P5) we show that for C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and Ω ≥ 0 is its maximum
reached at the point that is feasible also for (P1), namely at (C¯1, α¯) (with α¯ being defined
later), and as utility functions of (P1) and (P5) coincide at this point then the utility function
of (P1) at (C∗1 , α
∗) exceeds the one at (C¯1, α¯).
In more detail, as dE(U)dα is the same for both (P1) and (P5) then the second equation in
(29) implies that for any fixed C1 is the expected utility of (P5) concave and thus its maximum
is achieved at (30). I.e., if C˜1 is such that 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ C¯1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
then for this fixed C˜1 is
maximum of (P5) reached at (C˜1, α˜) where α˜ =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf−rb+K
1
γ
0 (rg−rf )
((1+ rf )(Y1− C˜1)+Y2− C¯2).
Note that (C˜1, α˜) is feasible for (P5). Thus, the only candidates for the maximum for (P5)
are (C˜1, α˜) with 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ C¯1. By plugging this point into the expected utility of (P5) we
obtain
(1− γ)E(U) = −λ(C¯1 − C˜1)
1−γ
+ δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2 +
(rg − rf )(1−K
1/γ
0 )
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2
)]1−γ
+ δ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2 −
(rf − rb)(1 −K
1/γ
0 )
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2
)]1−γ
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which after some derivations gives
(1− γ)E(U) = −λ(C¯1 − C˜1)
1−γ + δ
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2
)1−γ ( rg − rb
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
)1−γ
×
(
p+ (1− p)K
1−γ
γ
0
)
= −λ(C¯1 − C˜1)
1−γ +


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ (
Y1 − C˜1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
)1−γ
If the expected utility of (P5) is increasing function in C˜1, i.e.,
dE(U)
dC˜1
> 0 then the maximum
will be reached at (C¯1, α¯), where α¯ =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf−rb+K
1
γ
0 (rg−rf )
Ω. In more detail, the inequality below
dE(U)
dC˜1
= λ(C¯1 − C˜1)
−γ −


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ (
Y1 − C˜1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
)−γ
> 0
holds if
λ >


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ (
C¯1 − C˜1
Ω
1+rf
+ C¯1 − C˜1
)γ
(42)
If C˜1 < C¯1 then the right hand side of the inequality (42) is below

k2
(
1+K
1
γ
γ
)
1+rf


γ
=
(
M
1+rf
)γ
,
whereM is defined by (8), and as this is exceeded by λ, i.e., λ >
(
M
1+rf
)γ
, see assumptions of
Proposition 1, then E(U) is increasing in C˜1 and the maximum is reached at (C¯1, α¯), what we
wanted to show. Finally, there is no feasible solution for the case when C¯1 ≥ C1 > Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
as it implies that Ω < 0 which is in contradiction with our assumption.
It can be derived in the same way that for Ω = 0 the utility of (P5)
(1− γ)E(U) = (C¯1 − C˜1)
1−γ

−λ+


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ

is an increasing function in C˜1 for λ >
(
M
1+rf
)γ
and thus the maximum will be reached for
(C1 = C¯1, α = 0).
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Finally, in the identical way as in problem (P2) it can be shown for Ω ≥ 0 that all possible
candidates for maximum in problem (P6) are also feasible solutions of (P5) and as the
expected utility function of problem (P6) in these points coincide with the expected utility
function of (P5) then utility of (P5) in its maximum exceeds the utility function of problem
(P6) at its feasible solutions. Note that there is no feasible solution of problem (P7)when
Ω > 0 and the only feasible solution for Ω = 0 is (C1 = C¯1, α = 0).
Problem (P8) has no feasible solution.
Appendix C: Ω < 0
Proof of Proposition 3.
As in the proof of Lemma 1 we proceed in two steps. At first we assume that C1 ≤
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and then C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Note that for C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
< C¯1 (as Ω < 0) it
follows that only cases C1 < C¯1 could be considered and thus only problems (P5)–(P8) need
to be solved.
Problem (P1). For Ω < 0 there is no feasible solution for (P1).
Problem (P2). There is no feasible solution for C1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Let C1 > Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and in
addition we assume λ > λΩ<01 and C¯2 <
rg−rb
rf−rb
(
(1 + rf )
(
Y1 − C¯1
)
+ Y2
)
= C¯P22 . We proceed
in the following way: At first we solve the problem (P2) as an unconstrained problem i.e.,
we solve ∇E(U) = 0, so that the FOC are satisfied, obtain the unique solution (CP21 , α
P2),
verify that the objective function of (P2) is concave at (CP21 , α
P2) and that the solution
is also feasible. As the utility function is differentiable at the domain under consideration,
(CP21 , α
P2) is the only local extrema (namely local maximum) and if the objective function
at the border of (P2) does not exceed its value at (CP21 , α
P2), then this point is also a global
maximum of (P2) when λ > λΩ<01 .
The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dC1
= (C1 − C¯1)
−γ −δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(1 + rf )
−λδ(1− p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 −C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(1 + rf ) = 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1− p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 −C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(43)
dE(U)
dα = 0 from (43) implies the following
p
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rf − rb)α
]γ
(rg − rf )
= λ(1− p)
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]γ
(rf − rb)
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which gives
(
1
K0
) 1
γ [
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rf − rb)α
]
= λ
1
γ
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]
This implies that
α =
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ (rg − rf )−
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(rf − rb)
(C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1))
=
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
(rg − rf )
(C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)) (44)
If we plug the last expression for α into the C1 part of the FOC in (43) we obtain
(C1 − C¯1)
−γ
δ(1 + rf )
=
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 −C1)
]−γ
×

p


(
1
K0
) 1
γ
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ


−γ
+ λ(1− p)

1 + λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
rf − rb
rg − rf


−γ
After some simplifications we obtain
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) = (C1 − C¯1)
rg − rf
rg − rb
[
δ(1 + rf )(1 − p)
rg − rb
rg − rf
] 1
γ
[
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]
= (C1 − C¯1)M1(λ) (45)
which gives (24). In addition, after plugging CP21 into (44) we obtain α
P2 as given in (25).
Note that
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C
P2
1 ) =
M1(λ)(−Ω)
M1(λ)− 1− rf
and thus assumption C1 > Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is satisfied for C1 = C
P2
1 only if Ω < 0 which happens
to be our assumption.
Note that (24), the assumptions Ω < 0 and λ > λΩ<01 (which gives M1(λ) > 1+ rf ) imply
that CP21 > C¯1.
What remains to be shown is when is the expected utility function strictly concave at
(CP21 , α
P2). For this to hold it is sufficient to show that the following holds at (CP21 , α
P2):
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d2E(U)
dα2
< 0 and D ≡ ∇2E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
> 0. Note that
CP22g − C¯2 =
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(rg − rb)
(rg − rf )
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
) M1(λ)
M1(λ)− 1− rf
(
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1)
)
= k
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
rg − rb
rg − rf
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(46)
C¯2 − C
P2
2b =
λ
1
γ (rg − rb)
(rg − rf )
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
) M1(λ)
M1(λ)− 1− rf
(
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1)
)
= k
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
rg − rb
rg − rf
λ
1
γ (47)
and thus C¯2 − C
P2
2b = (K0λ)
1
γ (CP22g − C¯2). Using (43), (46) and (47) we obtain the following
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC21
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
[
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]−1−γ
×
[
−1 +
1 + rf
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
− 1
γ −K
1
γ
0
rf − rb
rg − rf
)]
(48)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
(rf − rb)
2
k(1 + rf )
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]−1−γ (
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
)
(49)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC1dα
|(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
=
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]−1−γ (
λ−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)
Note that (49) and λ > 1Kγ imply that
d2E(U)
dα2 |(C1,α)=(CP21 ,αP2)
< 0. In addition,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]2(1+γ)
D =
[
−1 +
1 + rf
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ−
1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)]
×
rf − rb
k(1 + rf )
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [
(rf − rb)λ
− 1
γ − (rg − rf )K
1
γ
0
]
−
(
rf − rb
k
)2(rg − rf
rg − rb
)4(
λ
− 1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
and thus
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]2(1+γ) ( rg − rb
rg − rf
)2 k
rf − rb
D =
1
1 + rf
[
(rg − rf )K
1
γ
0 − (rf − rb)λ
− 1
γ
]
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+
1
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ
− 1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)[
(rf − rb)λ
− 1
γ − (rg − rf )K
1
γ
0
]
−
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
After some derivations we obtain
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
]2(1+γ) ( rg − rb
rg − rf
)2 k
rf − rb
D =
1
1 + rf
[
(rg − rf )K
1
γ
0 − (rf − rb)λ
− 1
γ
]
−
rg − rf
k
λ−
1
γK
1
γ
0
Now it can be easily shown that if λ >
[
1+rf
k +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
, which follows from assumption
λ > λΩ<01 and (21), then D > 0.
Regarding the feasibility, note that (46) and (47) imply that CP22g > C¯2 and C
P2
2b < C¯2. In
addition, (47), C¯2 ≤ C¯
P2
2 and λ > λ
Ω<0
1 imply that C
P2
2b ≥ 0.
28
Note that
(1− γ)E(U(CP21 , α
P2)) =
(
−Ω
M1(λ)− 1− rf
)1−γ [
1 +
k
1 + rf
((
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
− λ
1
γ
)]
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
[
k
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
− 1− rf
]γ
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
kγ
[
λ
1
γ − (1− c˜P2)
(
λΩ<01
) 1
γ
]γ
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
(M1(λ)− 1− rf )
γ (50)
What remains to show is that feasible solutions at the border do not exceed the expected
utility at (CP21 , α
P2), where (P2) obtains its local maximum. The feasible solution at the
border that come into consideration are: (i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = 0 and (iv)
C1 = C¯1.
Case (i). C2g = C¯2 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α for −Ωrg−rf ≤ α ≤
C¯2
rg−rb
and thus
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α, α
))
=
(
Ω+ (rg − rf )α
1 + rf
)1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γα1−γ
28Note that if we would not want to guarantee C2b ≥ 0 then it would be sufficient to have λ
Ω<0
1 =[
1+rf
k
+
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]γ
. The more complicated expression of λΩ<01 defined by (21) follows from the constraint
C2b ≥ 0. Also condition C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 is implied by the constraint C2b ≥ 0.
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The following can be easily shown
lim
α→+ −Ω
rg−rf
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α, α
))
dα
= +∞
and
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α, α
))
dα
∣∣∣
α=α1
= 0
where
α1 =
kλ
1
γ (−Ω)(
kλ
1
γ − 1− rf
)
(rg − rf )
Note in addition that α1 ≤
C¯2
rg−rb
for λ >
[
1+rf
k(1−c˜P2)
]γ
, where c˜P2 =
(rg−rb)(−Ω)
(rg−rf )C¯2
and that
d2E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α, α
))
dα2
∣∣∣
α=α1
< 0
Thus, for λ >
[
1+rf
k(1−c˜P2)
]γ
is the maximum reached at α1. As
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α1, α1
))
= −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
(
kλ
1
γ − 1− rf
)γ
(51)
then based on this it can be shown that for λ > λΩ<01
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α1, α1
))
< (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
where (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
= − (−Ω)
1−γ
1+rf
[
k
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
− 1− rf
]γ
, see (50). In sum-
mary, there are only two possible candidates for the maximum: (1) α = C¯2rg−rb , which is tackled
in case (iii) and (2) α = α1 for λ >
[
1+rf
k(1−c˜P2)
]γ
where we have shown that expected utility at(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α1, α1
)
is smaller than the expected utility at
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
.
Case (ii). C2b = C¯2 when C1 = Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α. This case has no feasible solution as
C1 can not exceed Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
.
Case (iii). C2b = 0 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α for C¯2rg−rb ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
and
thus
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α, α
))
=
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − (rf − rb)α
1 + rf
)1−γ
+δp
(
(rg − rb)α− C¯2
)1−γ
− λδ(1 − p)C¯1−γ2
47
It can be shown that this expected utility function is concave and thus its maximum is reached
either at αP20 where
dE
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α, α
))
dα
∣∣∣
α=αP20
= 0
or at one of the end-points. After some derivations we obtain
αP20 =
1 + rf
k2 + 1 + rf
C¯2
rg − rb
+
k2
k2 + 1 + rf
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
rf − rb
(52)
which is a convex combination of the end-points and thus the maximum is reached at α = αP20
such that C¯2rg−rb < α
P20 <
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
. The last inequalities imply that optimal C1 is
strictly above C¯1 and optimal C2g is strictly above C¯2. Further derivations give
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP201 = Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
αP20, αP20
))
=
=
kγ
1 + rf
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
C¯2
)1−γ [(( 1
Kγ
) 1
γ
+
1 + rf
k
)γ
(1− c˜P2)1−γ − λ
]
= δ(1 − p) C¯1−γ2
[
λΩ<01 (1− c˜
P2)− λ
]
(53)
Finally, based on this and (50) it can be shown that for λ > λΩ<01
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP201 , α
P20
))
< (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
(54)
if(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
−
1 + rf
k
)γ (
c˜P2
)1−γ
< λ−
((
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
+
1 + rf
k
)γ (
1−
(
c˜P2
))1−γ
or if
F (λ) ≡ λ−
((
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
+
1 + rf
k
)γ (
1−
(
c˜P2
))1−γ
−
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
−
1 + rf
k
)γ (
c˜P2
)1−γ
> 0
The last inequality holds as F (λ) is a convex function with the minimum being reached at
λ = λΩ<01 , see (21), where F (λ
Ω<0
1 ) = 0.
Case (iv). C1 = C¯1 for
−Ω
rg−rf
≤ α ≤
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
and thus
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
= δp (Ω + (rg − rf )α)
1−γ − λδ(1− p) (−Ω+ (rf − rb)α)
1−γ (55)
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The following can be easily shown
lim
α→+ −Ω
rg−rf
dE
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
dα
= +∞ (56)
and
dE
(
U
(
C¯1, α
))
dα
∣∣∣
α=α3
= 0
for
α3 =
λ
1
γ +
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
(−Ω)
rg − rf
and λ > 1Kγ . As
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α3
))
= −
kγ(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)γ
(57)
then based on this and (50) it can be shown that for λ > λΩ<01
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
C¯1, α3
))
< (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
Note that the maximum can not be reached at −Ωrg−rf , see (56), and another end-point, α =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
, is tackled in case (iii).
There is no feasible solution for problem (P3) when Ω < 0.
Problem (P4). There is no feasible solution for C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Let C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
.
At first we show that no local extreme can be a local maximum. This implies that, as the
function is continuous, a maximum will occur at the border of the set of feasible solutions.
In more detail
dE(U)
dα
= λδp
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1 − p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(rf − rb)
and thus
d2E(U)
dα2
= λγδp
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)− (rg − rf )α
]−γ−1
(rg − rf )
2
+λγδ(1 − p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ−1
(rf − rb)
2 > 0
This excludes the possibility of the objective function of (P4) to obtain its maximum in
the interior and thus it would occur at the border of the feasible solutions of problem (P4).
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Now we will consider feasible solutions at the border, namely: (i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2,
(iii) C2g = 0, (iv) C2b = 0 and (v) C1 = C¯1. Note that case (i) coincides with case (i)
when proving (P2) and there is only one feasible solution in cases (ii) and (iii), namely(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
, which is feasible also for (P2).
Case (iii). The only feasible solution for C2g = 0 is (C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
, α = 0) with the
utility function being
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
, 0
))
=
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
− λδC¯1−γ2
which is dealt in case (iv) below.
(1− γ)E(U(C1, α)) =
(
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − (rf − rb)α
1 + rf
)1−γ
− λδp(C¯2 − (rg − rb)α)
1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)C¯1−γ2 (58)
Case (iv). C2b = 0 when C1 = Y1+
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α and 0 ≤ α ≤ C¯2rg−rb and the utility function
is given by (41). The potential candidates for maximum are α = 0, α = C¯2rg−rb and α = α¯
where α¯ is a unique stationary point such that dE(U)dα
∣∣∣
α=α¯
= 0 where
α¯ =
(λδp(rg − rb))
1
γ
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1+rf
)
−
(
rf−rb
1+rf
) 1
γ
C¯2
(λδp(rg − rb))
1
γ
rf−rb
1+rf
−
(
rf−rb
1+rf
) 1
γ
(rg − rb)
Note that for C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 is α¯ infeasible and for C¯2 = C¯
P2
2 is α¯ =
C¯2
rg−rb
. For α = C¯2rg−rb is the
point
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
C¯2
rg−rb
, α = C¯2rg−rb
)
feasible for (P2). Finally, we show that the
utility function at α = 0 is below the utility function at
(
CP21 , α
P2
)
; i.e., that
E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
, 0
))
≤ E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
(59)
We proceed in two steps. If λ˜Ω<0 ≥ λΩ<01 then we show that
E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
, 0
))
≤ E
(
U
(
CP201 , α
P20
))
(60)
where
(
CP201 , α
P20
)
and E
(
U
(
CP201 , α
P20
))
are given by (52) and (53). Inequality (60) holds
for λ ≥ λ˜Ω<0 which implies that also (59) holds as for λ > λΩ<01 is E
(
U
(
CP201 , α
P20
))
<
E
(
U
(
CP21 , α
P2
))
. On the other hand, if λ˜Ω<0 < λΩ<01 then (59) can be shown directly.
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Let λ˜Ω<0 ≥ λΩ<01 . Then (60) holds if
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
− λδ C¯1−γ2 ≤ δ(1 − p)C¯
1−γ
2
[(
1− c˜P2
)
λΩ<01 − λ
]
which holds if
λ ≥ λ˜Ω<0 ≡
1
p

1
δ
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1+rf
C¯2
)1−γ
− (1− p)
(
1− c˜P2
)
λΩ<01


Let λ˜Ω<0 > λΩ<01 . Then for λ > λ
Ω<0
1 (59) holds if
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
kγ
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
−
1 + rf
k
)γ
≤ λδ C¯1−γ2 −
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
Let
G(λ) ≡
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
kγ
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
−
1 + rf
k
)γ
− λδ C¯1−γ2 +
(
Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2
1 + rf
)1−γ
(61)
As G(λ) is a continuous decreasing function in λ29 and as G(λ˜Ω<0) ≤ 0 ≤ G(λΩ<01 ) then there
exists λP20 ∈
[
λΩ<01 , λ˜
Ω<0
]
such that G(λP20 ) = 0. Thus, is obtained at
(
C1 = C
P2
1 , α = α
P2
)
if λ > λP20 .
Thus, (59) holds for λ > max
{
λ˜Ω<0, λΩ<01
}
.
Case (v). The utility function of (P4) with C1 = C¯1 is
E(U(C1, α)) = −λδp
(−Ω− (rg − rf )α)
1−γ
1− γ
− λδ(1 − p)
(−Ω+ (rf − rb)α)
1−γ
1− γ
for 0 ≤ α ≤
−Ω
rg − rf
(62)
when C¯2 ≤ C¯
P2
2 . It can be easily shown that utility function (62) is convex and thus its
maximum is reached at either α = 0, for which is C1 = C¯1, α = 0 infeasible, or α =
−Ω
rg−rf
, for
which is
(
C¯1,
−Ω
rg−rf
)
feasible for (P2).
Problem (P5). Note that for C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
there is only one feasible solution, namely
(C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0), which is thus feasible for case when C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
(see below).
When C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
it is easy to show that for any fixed C˜1 such that 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤
29This follows from λ ≥ λΩ<01 ≥


(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
+
1+rf
k
1−(1−p)
1
1−p c˜P2


γ
where the latter inequality follows from λΩ<01 ≤ λ˜
Ω<0.
51
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is the expected utility of (P5) concave and thus its maximum is achieved at
α˜ =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
((1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2) ≥ 0 (63)
Note also that (C˜1, α˜) is feasible for (P5). Thus, the candidates for the maximum for (P5)
are (C˜1, α˜) with 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and α˜ given by (63). By plugging this point into the
expected utility of (P5) we obtain (after some derivations)
(1− γ)E(U) = −λ(C¯1 − C˜1)
1−γ + λˆ
(
Y1 − C˜1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
)1−γ
(64)
where
λˆ =


k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
=


k
(
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
As this expected utility is not monotone or concave – in C˜1 such that 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
–
the maximum of (64) can be reached at either end points (see cases (i) and (ii) below) or at
the point (see case (iii) below) where dE(U)
dC˜1
∣∣∣
C˜1=CP51
= 0 with E(U) being given by (64). Thus,
the cases under consideration are
(i) C˜1 = 0 where
UP5i ≡ (1− γ)E(U) = −λC¯1−γ1 + λˆ
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
)1−γ
(ii) C˜1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
where
UP5ii ≡ (1− γ)E(U) = −λ
(
−Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ
(iii) C˜1 = C
P5
1 ≡
(
Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
)
λ
1
γ −C¯1λˆ
1
γ
λ
1
γ −λˆ
1
γ
for λ ≥ λΩ<02 where
λΩ<02 = λˆ

 C¯1
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf


γ
to guarantee that 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Note in addition that CP51 is the only stationary
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point of E(U) given by (64). Thus,
UP5 ≡ (1− γ)E(U) = −
(
−Ω
1 + rf
)1−γλ 1γ −
k2
(
1 +K
1
γ
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
(65)
= −
(
−Ω
1 + rf
)1−γ (
λ
1
γ − λˆ
1
γ
)γ
It can be shown that E(U) given by (64) is concave at C1 = C
P5
1 given by case (iii) as C
P5
1
is the only stationary point there. Thus, the maximum for (P5) with λ ≥ λΩ<02 is reached in
case (iii), i.e., at point

0 < CP51 =
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
)
λ
1
γ − C¯1λˆ
1
γ
λ
1
γ − λˆ
1
γ
< C¯1, α
P5 =
1−K
1
γ
0
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
λˆ
1
γ
λ
1
γ − λˆ
1
γ
(−Ω) > 0


Let
UP2 ≡ (1− γ)E(U(CP21 , α
P2)) = −
(−Ω)1−γ
1 + rf
[
k
(
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
− 1− rf
]γ
Note that (65) can be written also as
UP5 = (1− γ)E
(
U
(
CP51 , α
P5
))
= −
(
−Ω
1 + rf
)1−γλ 1γ −
k
(
1 +
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
)
1 + rf


γ
Then for λ ≥ λΩ<02 the utility function of problem (P2) at its maxima is related to the utility
function of (P5) at its maximum as follows: UP2 > UP5 for k < 1 + rf , U
P2 = UP5 for
k = 1 + rf and U
P2 < UP5 for k > 1 + rf . Note in addition that condition k ≤ 1 + rf is
equivalent to δ ≤ δ+ and condition k2 ≤ 1 + rf is equivalent to δ ≤ δ
−.
Problem (P6). We proceed in two steps: for case C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
we show that there is
no interior local maximum or minimum for (P6) which implies that the maximum will occur
at the border of the set of feasible solutions for (P6). Then we check all potential feasible
solutions at the border. For case C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
we show that all possible candidates for
maximum are also feasible solutions of (P5) which is the case we have already dealt with.
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Let C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. The first order conditions are
dE(U)
dC1
= λ(C¯1 − C1)
−γ −δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(1 + rf )
−λδ(1− p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 −C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(1 + rf ) = 0
dE(U)
dα = δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1− p)
[
C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 −C1) + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(rf − rb) = 0


(66)
dE(U)
dα = 0 from (66) implies the expression for α given by (44) and if we plug it into the C1
part of the FOC in (66) we obtain after some simplifications
λ
1
γ (C¯2 − Y2 − (1 + rf )(Y1 − C1)) = (C¯1 − C1)
rg − rf
rg − rb
[
δ(1 + rf )(1− p)
rg − rb
rg − rf
] 1
γ
[
λ
1
γ −
(
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
]
= (C¯1 − C1)M1(λ)
which gives
C+1 =
C¯1M1(λ) + λ
1
γ [(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2 − C¯2]
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
= C¯1 +
Ω
M1(λ)
λ
1
γ
+ 1 + rf
(67)
In addition, after plugging C+1 from (67) into (44) we obtain
α+ =
k
rg − rf
[(
1
K0
) 1
γ
+ λ
1
γ
]
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
Next we show that the expected utility function is indifferent at (C+1 , α
+), namely, we show
that at (C+1 , α
+) are d
2
E(U)
dα2
< 0, and D3 ≡ ∇
2
E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
< 0.
Note that
C+2g − C¯2 = k
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
rg − rb
rg − rf
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(68)
C¯2 − C
+
2b = k
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
rg − rb
rg − rf
λ
1
γ (69)
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and thus C¯2− (C
+
2b) = (K0λ)
1
γ ((C+2g)− C¯2). Using (66), (68) and (69) we obtain the following
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC21
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
[
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
]−1−γ
×
[
1
λ
1
γ
+
1 + rf
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
0
rf − rb
rg − rf
)]
(70)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
(rf − rb)
2
k(1 + rf )
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
]−1−γ (
λ
− 1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
)
(71)
1
γ
d2E(U)
dC1dα
|(C+1 ,α+)
=
rf − rb
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [ −Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
]−1−γ (
λ−
1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)
(72)
Note that (71) and λ > 1Kγ implies that
d2E(U)
dα2
|(C+1 ,α+)
< 0. In addition,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
]2(1+γ)
D =
[
1
λ
1
γ
+
1 + rf
k
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2(
λ−
1
γ −
rf − rb
rg − rf
K
1
γ
0
)]
×
(rf − rb)
2
k(1 + rf )
(
rg − rf
rg − rb
)2 [
λ−
1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
]
−
(
rf − rb
k
)2(rg − rf
rg − rb
)4(
λ
− 1
γ +K
1
γ
0
)2
where D = ∇2E(U(C1, C2))(C+1 ,α+)
= d
2
E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2 ∣∣
(C+1 ,α
+)
. Thus,
1
γ2
[
−Ω
M1(λ) + λ
1
γ (1 + rf )
]2(1+γ) (
rg − rb
rg − rf
)2 k
rf − rb
D =
rf − rb
1 + rf
[
λ
− 1
γ −K
1
γ
γ
]
−
rg − rf
k
λ
− 1
γK
1
γ
0 < 0
for λ > 1Kγ which gives that D = ∇
2
E(U(C1, C2)) =
d2E(U)
dC21
d2E(U)
dα2
−
(
d2E(U)
dC1dα
)2
< 0. Thus, the
expected utility is indifferent at (C+1 , α1), also for λ ≤
1
Kγ
, which is the only point satisfying
the FOC and thus the maximum will occur at the border.
The feasible solutions at the border for (P6) that come into consideration are given by:
(i) C2g = C¯2, (ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2b = 0, (iv) C1 = C¯1 and (v) C1 = 0.
Case (i): C2g = C¯2 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
+
rg−rf
1+rf
α and 0 ≤ α ≤ −Ωrg−rf . It can be seen
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that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
+
rg − rf
1 + rf
α,α
))
= −λ
(
−Ω− (rg − rf )α
1 + rf
)1−γ
−λδ(1 − p)(rg − rb)
1−γα1−γ
is a convex function in α and thus its maximum is reached either for α = 0 or α = −Ωrg−rf .
Thus, the potential candidates for maximum in this case are
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
or(
C1 = C¯1, α =
−Ω
rg−rf
)
. Note that point
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
is feasible also for (P5) and
is also the only feasible solution for case (ii). On the other hand, point
(
C1 = C¯1, α =
−Ω
rg−rf
)
is feasible solution for (P2).
Case (iii). C2b = 0 when C1 = Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α which is feasible for
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
≤ α ≤ C¯2rf−rb . It can be seen that
(1− γ)E
(
U
(
Y1 +
Y2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α,α
))
= −λ
(
C¯1 − Y1 −
Y2
1 + rf
+
(rf − rb)
1 + rf
α
)1−γ
+δp((rg − rb)α− C¯2)
1−γ − λδ(1 − p)C¯1−γ2
(73)
The potential maximum of (73) thus can be reached either at the endpoints α =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
and α = C¯2rf−rb or at the point α
P6 such that
dE
(
U
(
Y1+
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α,α
))
dα
∣∣∣
αP6
= 0. Simple
derivation gives
αP6 ≡
λ1/γ − k21+rf
C¯P22
C¯2
λ1/γ − k21+rf
C¯2
rg − rb
(74)
which for C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 is below
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
and thus infeasible. This implies then that for
C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 the maximum of (73) can be reached only at the end points, namely(
C1 = C¯1, α =
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2
rf−rb
)
or
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = C¯2rf−rb
)
where the former is fea-
sible also for (P2) and the latter for (P6) which will be dealt with later (in case when
C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
).
In case (iv) any feasible solution is also feasible for (P2). There is no feasible solution in
case (v).
Let C1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Note that the utility of (P6) is a decreasing function in α for any fixed
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C1
dE(U)
dα
= δp
[
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]−γ
(rg − rf )
−λδ(1 − p)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
]−γ
(rf − rb) < 0
if
λ >
p(rg − rf )
(1− p)(rf − rb)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]γ
The latter is achieved if
1
Kγ
≥
p(rg − rf )
(1− p)(rf − rb)
[
(1 + rf )(C1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 + (rf − rb)α
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C1) + Y2 − C¯2 + (rg − rf )α
]γ
as it is assumed that λ > 1Kγ where Kγ is given by (7). It can be shown that the above
inequality holds if C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+r which is our assumption. In more detail, the set of
feasible solutions for (P6) can be written as
0 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+rf )Y1+Y2
rf−rb
Let C˜1 be fixed and such that 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. Based on the first inequality in the
second row of the inequalities above and the fact that the utility of (P6) is decreasing in α it
follows that the smallest possible α˜ such that the feasible set is satisfied for C1 = C˜1 is given
by
Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
−
rf − rb
1 + rf
α˜ = C˜1
and thus
α˜ =
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C˜1) + Y2 − C¯2
rf − rb
∈
[
0,
(1 + rf )Y1 + Y2
rf − rb
]
Note that (C˜1, α˜) completes C˜1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
rf−rb
1+rf
α˜ = C˜1 +
C¯2
1+rf
as C¯2 ≥ 0. Thus, for any
given C˜1 that satisfies 0 ≤ C˜1 ≤ Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is the point
(
C˜1,
(1+rf )(Y1−C˜1)+Y2−C¯2
rf−rb
)
where the
utility of (P6) achieves its maxima. As point (C˜1, α˜) is feasible also for (P5) and as utilities
of (P5) and (P6) coincide at this point then the utility function of (P5) at its maximum is
bigger or equal to the utility function of (P6) at any point (C˜1, α˜).
Problem (P7). The only feasible solution is
(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
which is feasible also for (P5).
Problem (P8). Note that the only feasible solution for case when C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
is
57
(
C1 = Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, α = 0
)
. Let C1 ≥ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
. As d
2
E(U(C1,α))
dα2 > 0 then no local extreme
can be a local maximum. Thus, an maximum will occur at the border of the set of feasible
solutions. The feasible solutions at the border that come into considerations are: (i) C2g = C¯2,
(ii) C2b = C¯2, (iii) C2g = 0, (iv) C2b = 0, (v) C1 = C¯1 and (vi) C1 = 0. Note that case (i)
was already dealt with in case (i) of problem (P6) and the only feasible solution in case (ii) is(
Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
, 0
)
which is feasible also for (P5). In addition, there are no feasible solutions in
cases (iii) and (vi) and neither in case (iv) for C¯2 < C¯
P2
2 . Finally, if C1 = C¯, case (v), then
any feasible solution will be feasible also for (P4).
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